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CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, 
MANAGEMENT. By Robert C. Post. Cambridge: Harvard Univer-
sity Press. 1995. Pp. ix, 463. $45. 
INTRODUCTION 
There's one First Amendment, not a collection of first amend-
ments. This one First Amendment has just fourteen words touching 
free speech and freedom of the press, not a code of provisions, each 
applying differently in separate spheres of social life. These four-
teen words about speech and the press speak to us directly - with 
apparent simplicity, limiting the sovereign's powers in ways plainly 
established. Yet out of this one amendment, out of these fourteen 
words, out of this simplicity, constitutional law has generated an 
enormous complexity. No single principle explains its contours; no 
simple set of ideas describes its reach. There is none of the tidiness 
of the constitutional text - none of its directness. 
We live in an age when this complexity has a certain cost. The 
cost is instability. Nothing ties this complicated doctrine to a well 
understood text; nothing cabins its principles to a manageable core. 
The complexity is generative, and its generation continues. And 
with this growth comes a growing impatience that after 200 years 
it's not clear why there's more to discover. If we were really just 
working it out, wouldn't we have gotten it by now? 
Come then the theorists, with two sorts of replies. The first 
looks for a principle, or set of principles, with which to explain and 
justify this complicated array. The idea is to unify the doctrine 
around a principled core, and the belief is that there will be this one 
principle, or small set of principles, that can stand outside any par-
ticular First Amendment context, yet guide First Amendment in-
quiry in every First Amendment context. In this way is the 
approach Rawlsian - not in substance but in form.1 It is the 
search for, as Frederick Schauer calls it, the "free speech principle"2 
* B.A., B.S. 1983, University of Pennsylvania; M.A. Phil. 1986, Cambridge University; 
J.D. 1989, Yale. - Ed. Funding provided by the Russell Baker Scholars Fund, and Sarah 
Scaife Foundation. Thanks to Richard Craswell for comments on an earlier draft, and to 
Ashley Charles Parrish for research assistance. 
1. See JoHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JusnCE (1971) (presenting this fonn). 
2. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY (1982). 
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- the project of Alexander Meiklejohn, and Martin Redish, and 
Geoffrey Stone, and the work of a generation of constitutional law. 
The second reply begins not in the sky, as it were, but on the 
ground. It asks not what is the free speech principle, then to be 
applied in every free speech context, but rather, what are the con-
texts within which the free speech principle applies, and how do 
these contexts, and the free speech ideals within them, differ. In 
political philosophy, it is the approach of Michael Walzer3 - asking 
(about a theory of justice) not what is the principle of justice that 
gets applied in each context of justice, but what are the principles of 
justice inherent in the separate spheres within which justice ques-
tions get raised, how do they relate, and how do we draw bounda-
ries between these separate spheres. 
Robert Post4 is law's Michael Walzer. His aim is not to find the 
free speech principle (p. 16). His aim instead is to understand the 
principles inherent in separate domains of constitutional life, and 
then to find a way to speak of, and integrate, these local principles. 
His method is in part realist, and in part post-realist - realist in its 
openness to the differences of social context, and its willingness to 
use nonlegal material to understand the stuff law must regulate; 
post-realist in its effort nonetheless to find a language within law 
with which to understand the differences that this openness 
reveals.5 There is only one First Amendment, but its meaning, Post 
might say, depends upon these different domains of constitutional 
life. The task of constitutional theory should be to understand how 
to relate these different domains, by understanding the principles 
inherent in each. 
My intuitions are more Walzerian than Rawlsian, more Post 
than Meiklejohn. I confess that theorizing about complexity just 
strikes me as better than theorizing into simplicity. My aim in the 
first part of this essay is to convince you of the same. I will speak as 
a disciple, for my hope is to persuade that this way of understanding 
constitutional law better understands, and better justifies, the law 
that we have than do any of the alternatives. This is an important 
book by one of America's foremost constitutional scholars; its 
3. See MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE (1983) (presenting this substance). 
4. Robert Post is the Alexander F. & May T. Morrison Professor of Law at the University 
of California at Berkeley School of Law. 
5. As Post puts it: 
American constitutional scholars of my generation inhabit the aftermath of legal re-
alism. No longer for us can the law glow with an innocent and pristine autonomy; no 
longer can it be seen to subsist in elegant and evolving patterns of doctrinal rules. In-
stead we naturally and inevitably read legal standards as pragmatic instrumel)ts of pol-
icy. We seek to use the law as a tool to accomplish social ends, and the essence of our 
scholarly debate revolves around the question of what those ends ought to be. 
P. 1. 
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method is distinctive and its conclusions are rich. It should be at 
the center of our thought about free speech in America. 
In the second part I will be more skeptical. For there is a san-
guinity to the account here that I do not share. Post writes as if he 
has told a story that will let constitutional law sleep - an under-
standing of constitutional law that can make us comfortable with 
what we are doing, recommitted to the task at hand. But I think the 
story should disturb. This is not an account that will make constitu-
tional law any easier; it is not an account that shows why constitu-
tional law can function well within our interpretive context. It is 
in~tead an account that will reveal just why constitutional law for us 
remains so difficult. Post wants us to be post-realist in our ap-
proach,6 but what he teaches may make us post-constitutional 
instead. 
"Post-constitutional" means just this: Constitutionalism is that 
practice of a constitutional culture where limits on the authority of 
actors with power are enforced in the name of constitutional princi-
ple. In the United States, this enforcement is by a court, and here a 
court's willingness, or eagerness, to act as a constitutional check 
turns in large part upon the extent to which the court can appear 
merely to be executing the constitution's command. Clarity, sim-
plicity, and directness in a constitution translate into vigor. Consti-
tutionalism in this sense requires a certain sort of vigor. 
Post-constitutionalism has lost this. When constitutional com-
mands don't appear clear, or when they rest transparently upon 
contested, heated, nonlegal debate, courts are more reluctant. They 
are reluctant to resolve disputes in these contested domains, be-
cause resolution of matters of contest seems within the domain of 
the democratic branches. The effect of the contest then is to shift 
questions from constitutional control to political control, from con-
stitutionalism to democracy.1 
Post rightfully, from the standpoint of truth, criticizes the clum-
siness of free speech doctrine. He teaches us something about the 
sociological facts underlying legal doctrine. He helps us see more 
clearly the contest of ~tructures that present doctrine lets us ignore. 
He has, in this powerful book, drawn back the curtain in a land of 
constitutional Oz. 
But what this understanding will do is not clear. For what it. 
does most directly is reveal the contest of values that current doc-
trine covers with the label "neutral." This is realism brought to 
First Amendment thought - the last bastion of liberal and formal 
6. See J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First 
Amendment, 1990 DuKE LJ. 375. 
7. One fonn of this shift I describe as the "Erie·effect" in Lawrence Lessig, Understand-
ing Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395, 426-38 {1995). 
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constitutionalism. The question is whether the effect may well be 
not to liberate First Amendment thought, as much as to kill First 
Amendment constitutionalism. The question is whether post-
realism moves us beyond constitutionalism. 
I. THE DOMAINS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
We live our lives in many places - in the family, at work, in a 
public meeting, in the wilderness. These places have a certain logic, 
not wholly exclusive, but separate nonetheless. This logic defines 
what is appropriate in each place, sometimes it gives life in that 
place a purpose, sometimes it simply sets off a range of purposes. 
Walzer wrote of nine spheres of social life, each a place in the sense 
that I have used.8 Post wants to speak more generally, though 
about a narrower range of social life, by speaking of just three -
community, democracy, and management (p. 13). 
These three define three modalities in an individual's life. They 
define a kind of activity that goes on within each, and they suggest 
the limits that each may exert over an individual's life. The task of 
constitutional law, Post argues, is to make sense of constitutional 
structures against the background of these three separate domains; 
to develop a constitutional law that can respect the differences in 
these domains, and sustain them. More particularly, the task of 
First Amendment law must be to articulate a doctrine~ of free 
speech law that is sensitive to the differences between these do-
mains, and that helps ensure that the logic of one doesn't overrun 
life in another. 
But a constitutional theory must do more than describe; it must 
also guide. An approach respectful of different domains of social 
life must still provide lessons for resolving disputes at the borders. 
Domains are never wholly separate. We never live in just one sta-. 
ble place; and even when living in one place stably we are never 
immune from the influence of other places, and other domains. 
Domains, or spheres, are separate, but separate spheres bleed. 
They influence neighboring domains, and distant domains. The 
question is how, and whether, separate spheres are to be kept sepa-
rate; how lines between them are to be drawn. 
This was Ronald Dworkin's attack on Walzer.9 Dworkin argued 
not only that the ideal of a theory of justice based on these multiple 
spheres of justice was "not attainable," but also that it was "not 
coherent." The project, Dworkin argued, of looking to social con-
8. See WALZER, supra note 3 (describing the spheres of membership, security and wel-
fare, money and commodities, office, hard work, free time, education, kinship and love, and 
divine grace). 
9. See Ronald Dworkin, To Each His Own, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Apr. 14, 1983, at 4 (re-
viewing WALZER, supra note 3). 
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ventions to "discover appropriate principles of distribution" was 
simply "not helpful." Social conventions - or in the terms we have 
used, the logic dividing these separate domains - are inherently 
contested; if it is the lines between them that are to regulate polit-
ical debate, then these lines are always up for grabs. Nothing in this 
multiplicity could provide guidance; worse, nothing in this multi-
plicity could assure justice. The project was both too radical -
since offering no useful guide - and not radical enough - since it 
simply reflected existing social norms. 
This is the challenge that any Walzerian must meet. The chal-
lenge has two parts: The first is whether multiplicity can actually 
guide justice talk; the second is whether its guidance is anything 
more than a path home to the status quo. Can this technique con-
strain decisionmakers to do what is just, and can it liberate social 
contexts from injustice? These are (in part at least) empirical ques-
tions, and law is a structure for evaluating just how they work them-
selves out. For within law are institutions to adjudicate these 
claims, and a practice of adjudication that is essentially Walzerian. 
Law starts in a Walzerian world. Judges - not the most reflective 
of our intellectual elite - come to legal questions fully clothed, as 
it were, with the social understandings of these different social do- · 
mains. They have not been trained to cut away social context (the 
picture Justice Thomas gave us of a justice "stripped down like a 
runner"10 is a~ implausible as it is weird); they do not work to ab-
stract guiding and general social truth; they have been trained to 
resolve problems taking these social understandings, in some sense, 
for·granted. They just see the school as different from a newspaper, 
the Internet different from cable news. Judges don't start with the 
free speech principle; they start with an understanding of the social 
contexts within which it is to apply, and apply it. Or as Post would 
say, apply or "establish" or define them (pp. 2-3). 
The Rawlsian might regret this. He might counsel the lawyer to 
work quickly to abstract; he might say that the first task is to reflect 
ourselves out of these particular places, and discover a more gen-
eral rule. But the Walzerian, or (here we must switch finally to the 
lead in this play) the Postian, wants to make use of this starting 
point. He wants us to work from it, to understand a practice of free 
speech that can respect, and sustain, and track, these separate do-
mains of social life. "Like a chameleon," Post writes, the law must 
"transform itself to mimic and enhance the social domains it estab-
lishes and sustains" (pp. 2-3). 
The domains that Post describes, again, are community, democ-
racy, and management. The names don't announce their meaning. 
10. See Linda Greenhouse, In Trying To Clarify What He ls Not, Thomas Opens Question 
of What He ls, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1991, at A19 (quoting Thomas's testimony). 
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A little explanation is needed. I will consider them here in the or-
der Post does, though my use of them will not be as balanced as his. 
"Community" does not refer to Minot, North Dakota. It is not 
meant to refer to some time in the past when most lived in small 
towns with nosy neighbors. In the sense that Post intends, we all 
live in communities. For community here means that place, or 
those places, or that "form of social organization" (p. 180) where 
our identity is in some sense defined, or constituted, by the nature, 
or the structure, of those with whom we associate - a constitution 
through this practice of association; an identity produced through 
"connectedness." The community is that place, or those places, 
where who I am is in some way constituted by those with whom I 
associate. Not dictated, or determined (p. 182): the mechanisms of 
the construction of this identity are too complex for anything so 
simple, but influenced and directed and evolving "from forms of 
social interaction" (p. 128). It is the place where who I am is made, 
in part, by the associations that I make (p. 181 ). We all live in com-
munities, in this sense, even though we don't all live in Minot. 
Modernity therefore doesn't eliminate community; it simply 
transforms it.11 Post doesn't say much about how "community" has 
changed, or better, about how the institutions of community have 
changed, but many of the differences are obvious. We live today in 
more communities than before; these communities are not so much 
geographically based; they are, for the most part, more voluntary 
than status-driven; they are, for the most part, more private than 
public. We associate more than have associations, meaning we 
choose mqre what our associations will be, and more of who we are 
is defined by this association. But whether chosen or not, these as:-
sociations still define who we are. I may have the choice today to 
join a Catholic or Jewish congregation; but whichever I choose, if 
this becomes a large part of my life, much that I don't choose. 
(namely the structure of these communities) thereafter will define 
me. 
The domain of democracy has a different logic. In this place, I, 
and others, collectively determine what our governments will be, 
and to some extent, what our communities will be. Here is the 
place where collective, and reflective, judgment is to occur, not at 
the level of an individual's life, but at the level of a collective. Here 
is where the rules get made, through a process of collective judg-
ment about what the rules ought to be. The domain of democracy 
is the place where one is critical, where one steps outside of a par-
ticular life, or of a particular community, into a life set upon think-
ing reflectively about how we should live (p. 80). No one lives in 
11. For a sociological account of this transfonnation, see CLAUSES. FISCHER, To DWELL 
AMONG FRIENDS (1982). 
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the domain of democracy; we go there, for a short period of time 
perhaps, but long enough to look back on the place from where we 
came. Put too simply, democracy is more than majoritarianism (p. 
6); it is the place, free of comn;mnal constraints, where we choose 
how community should constrain us. 
And then there is the domain of management. This is the place 
of instrumentality, where an individual becomes the means to 
someone else's end - a cog in a machine, a tool for another's pur-
poses, an object to be manipulated. Ghastly it is, the place where 
alienation is to happen, where the categorical imperative is vio-
lated, where our hands are tom from our souls, where we become 
someone else's, at least for a time. Ghastly, but quite ordinary. For 
in measured doses, alienation is not all that bad. Kant, or Marx, 
notwithstanding, we are all means at some time to someone else's 
ends, and it's not all that bad. We are at times our lover's pillow, 
yet love is not the worse for it. For limited times, when voluntarily 
chosen, to an end that we believe in - when these are its condi-
tions, management is acceptable. Management is that place where 
we submit to instrumental structures of control, and while these 
structures exercise a control over us that doesn't exist in other do-
mains, the control they exercise is not, for that reason alone, inher-
ently evil. It is indeed just another part of life. 
Post's focus on the management domain is more limited than 
this. For his concern is the management domain where government 
is the manager. The question he wants to ask is how much the gov-
ernment, as manager, might demand. One might wonder more gen-
erally about the domain of management;12 but Post's focus is quite 
particular. Indeed, the narrow focus here raises an important ques-
tion about Post's strategy in general, a point that it is useful to flag 
from the start. 
These three domains are not exhaustive. We could imagine 
others. There is, for example, the domain of dominance - a place 
where a large number of humans live, subjected to a life of inequal-
ity or humiliation. This is a domain distinct from the domain of 
management, for there is no social meaning of inequality inherent 
in the domain of management. It is also distinct from community, 
for again, nothing in the idea of community compels inequality. Or, 
we might think of the domain of self-reflection, which, like the do-
main of democracy, is a place where critical reflection goes on, but 
which, unlike the domain of democracy, is a reflection at the level 
of the individual rather than the community. The domain of self-
12. So when Post writes "[t]he trend toward management compounds itself, because the 
growing rationalization of society undermines cultural norms that might otherwise sustain the 
alternative authority of community,'' this is just as applicable, one might think, to corporate 
management as to governmental. P. 5. Yet this public-private distinction is adopted here 
without any serious question. 
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reflection has its own logic; we might describe its contours and its 
limits; and these limits might matter to how we define the domain 
of community, or democracy. But this domain too is not the subject 
of Post's account. 
Thus the domains that Post describes are selected for a particu-
lar end. They are not all the possible domains of social life; they are 
those necessary to a very particular problem - namely, what is the 
constitutional regime necessary to our self-government? This is not 
a question asked in the abstract; he is asking it about us, and our 
constitutional history. But he is exploring it only so far as is neces-
sary to that relatively narrow social question. This is a subset of the 
question that Walzer might discuss; but it is the set necessary to 
understanding the constitutional problems put by the First 
Amendment. 
The book marches through these three domains, and its strategy 
throughout is to use each to suggest how they together play out this 
dynamic of reflective self-government.13 But throughout Post is 
also battling the impatient skepticism voiced by Dworkin against 
Walzer: Can this multiplicity provide guidance, and can it provide 
guidance of a useful, meaning critically reflective, kind?14 
The answer is in the telling, and in the balance of this section, I 
want to tell enough to give a sense of the structure of the account. 
It is a mistake, I will argue, to believe that contestedness at the 
borders means this plural account must fail. Post has demonstrated 
well just how solid this mix can be. But what Post hasn't done is 
identify a technique that will deal well with this conflict. This, how-
ever, is criticism, and this, with others, must await description. · 
\ 
Post begins with the domain of community. Community, as I 
have described, is that place where the individual, through interac-
tion, constructs, or realizes, or makes, her identity. Law helps con-
struct this place. Not just law, but in part law, and Post's focus at 
the start is on one way in which law helps construct that place. 
Courts don't "merely thematize and incorporate ambient cultural 
13.' The book actually begins with a chapter on constitutional interpretation, which I do 
not intend to consider in any detail in the discussion that follows. In it Post outlines three 
"distinct theories of interpretation": one attempts to implement the constitution through the 
articulation of explicit doctrinal rules; the second follows original intent; and a "third ... is a 
form of interpretation that reads the constitution in a manner designed to express the deep-
est contemporary purposes of the people." P. 29. This may miss a fourth approach, some-
where between the originalist and responsive: this is an approach that seeks to translate 
original values into the current interpretive context, a strategy in part originalist, and in part 
responsive, yet neither alone. See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Un-
derstanding, 60 B.U. L. REv. 204, 218 (1980); see also William Michael Treanor, The Original 
Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 782 (1995) 
(describing and applying the practice of translation). 
14. See Dworkin, supra note 9, at 4. 
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norms . . . . Instead courts must themselves display those norms" 
(p. 18). 
His focus is the protection of privacy - first, through the tort of 
intrusion, and second, through the tort of disclosure. It might seem 
odd that a cause of action in tort would be a tool for constructing 
community - in particular, this cause of action. The tort of privacy 
is a right that an individual has not to be messed with in a particular 
way. One might think it a paradigm of individualism, rather than 
communalism. It is how the individual draws fences around his life, 
or a device with which she may defend these fences.1s So how then 
does it have a role in making community? 
The key is this: while the tort protects an individual, the fences 
that it respects are fences collectively drawn. The tort doesn't rem-
edy any subjective injury; it remedies injuries considered by the 
community to be intrusions. Indeed, it gives this remedy whether 
the individual considers the intrusion an intrusion at all. Fences 
here are built by the tort, not by the victim; they reflect the commu-
nity's judgment about what is properly private, not the individual's. 
The tort constructs a space of appropriate privacy, and defends the 
individual against invasions of that space (p. 54). But it defends the 
individual not so much because the harm to the individual is so crit-
ical. Indeed, the tort survives even if there was no harm to the indi-
vidual (p. 56). The tort puts the affirmation of the state behind the 
idea that this space is properly private (p. 73), that it is inappropri-
ate, a violation, wrong, shameful, for someone to cross such a line. 
It is the state saying what is right or wrong in matters of individual 
dignity. It is the force of the state behind a particular conception of 
the good. 
The law's role here is constitutive of a certain kind of commu-
nity. It builds this community by defining a certain kind of civility 
- again, just one part of the norms of civility, and no doubt a small 
part (p. 65). At the edges, Post wants us to think, the state comes in 
and defines the extremes. The state does not enforce all such rules 
of civility. Most get enforced without the intervention of the state. 
Most, that is, get enforced through a kind of social pressure - a 
shaming, or stigma - that functions well enough without the power 
of the state. But at the extremes, the state intervenes. At the ex-
tremes, the civility rules of tort step in to enforce the minimum that 
the community demands. 
Civility norms define what kind of community a community is; a 
community is inherently a normative place, so civility norms are 
used to define a certain normative order. The state then, to the 
extent that it enforces these norms, is enforcing a certain kind of 
15. Cf. OsCAR H. GANDY, JR., THE PANOPTIC SoRr. A PoLmCAL ECONOMY OF PER· 
SONAL INFORMATION 190 (1993). 
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normative order. It does this by giving individuals a cause of action 
that punishes those who violate this normative order (p. 58); but 
what guides the application of this tool is an objective, not subjec-
tive, harm (p. 134). 
The same account applies to the second privacy tort that Post 
describes - the tort of disclosure. Here the story is a bit more 
complex, though the underlying structure is the same. The law pro-
tects the individual against the wrongful disclosure of certain facts 
about that individual. But it selects these facts not by calibrating 
some subjective measure of harm suffered by the individual. The 
law protects the individual when the disclosure is of the kind that 
the law considers wrongful. The law calls this "offensive" disclo-
sure, but offensiveness here is just a reflection of this objective stan-
dard. It is the construction, and support, that is, of a public 
conception of appropriateness; not, like most torts, simply a tool for 
remedying private wrongs. But unlike the tort of intrusion, the tort 
of public disclosure has an escape valve. Some disclosures, however 
harmful to the individual, will be allowed if they are about a "legiti-
mate public concern." Obviously, in defining what is a legitimate 
public concern, we are defining a contour of community. 
This is the kernel of the idea that eventually blossomed into the 
New York Times doctrine16 - an idea protecting certain disclosures 
in the name of a greater public interest in that disclosure. Certain 
speech must be allowed, regardless of its harm to an individual, be-
cause of its benefit to society. Harm is not eliminated; the burden 
of the harm is just shifted.17 When matters are within the immunity 
of the New York Times doctrine, the burden must fall on the victim; 
when they are outside it, it falls on the perpetrator. It is a law 
against theft, with a Robin Hood defense if the perpetrator splits 
the profits with the state. 
If New York Times were just about competing interests, or eco-
nomic interests, then these immunities would make no sense - at 
least as a constitutional claim. If all that were at issue were compet-
ing economic interests, then there would be no more reason to priv-
ilege the interest of the public against the interests of the private 
than there would be to privilege the interests of the private against 
the claims of the public. In either case, in a post-New Deal consti-
tution, we would, or should, simply leave this conflict of interests to 
the legislative process. 
But there is more here than a conflict of interests. Indeed, just 
as Post shows that neither tort is really much about protecting pri-
vate interests - both, that is, are better understood as protecting a 
public structure of civility - so too is the immunity from these ci-
16. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
17. See Frederick Schauer, Uncoupling Free Speech, 92 CoLuM. L. REV. 1321 (1992). 
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vility rules not so much about protecting those causing this particu-
lar harm as it is about constructing a certain kind of public space. 
This is the public space of accountability: a place where individuals 
must answer for their actions in the eyes of others (p. 19). The con-
flict between the individual interests and the interests of the com-
munity, then, must get resolved, again, through a conception of the 
community. 
There is a technique here that is important, and general. The 
technique is to see in the common law something other than what a 
laissez-faire conception of the common law might teach. By both 
the enemies, and friends, of the common law, we have been trained 
to see in the common law either the protection of the individual 
against the state, or the protection of the individual against another. 
But such divides are too simple. The common law in its protections 
of the individual also defined a certain kind of community. It was a 
tool for constructing a certain community (p. 61). Post's method 
helps us to see this construction, and his method extends quite eas-
ily outside the boundaries of tort. 
To contract, for example. Indeed Post's point might be made 
more strongly in the context of contract, for contract seems even 
more removed from the domain of community; more than tort, con-
tract appears to us a sphere of individual power, removed from the 
concerns of community. In the rhetoric of the nineteenth-century 
understanding of the doctrine, here more than anywhere was the 
place of individual autonomy, and individual power. Contract was 
the world where individuals made their own law; where, through 
agreement, they could bind themselves, and subject themselves to 
the power of the state; but where without agreement, they were 
free from the coercion of the state. 
Consider then the doctrine of reliance.is For much of the his-
tory of the nineteenth century, there was no enforceable doctrine of 
reliance in contract law. A promise was enforceable if it was sup-
ported by consideration - something given in exchange for the 
promise, and given because of the promise. Reliance on the prom-
ise alone could not make the promise enforceable. 
18. The following account is drawn from three sources: Jay M. Feinman, The Meaning of 
Reliance: A Historical Perspective, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 1373, 1375-88; Robert W. Gordon, 
Macaulay, Macnei~ and the Discovery of Solidarity and Power in Contract Law, 1985 Wis. L. 
REv. 565, 568-69; Michael B. Metzger & Michael J. Phillips, Promissory Estoppel and the 
Evolution of Contract Law, 18 AM. Bus. L.J. 139, 194-206 (1980). My colleague Richard 
Craswell warns me here that I am entering a debate about the evolution of contract doctrine 
that may be beyond the point of this essay. In particular, he suggests that contract law itself 
was enforcing contracts with consideration according to existing social norms as much as with 
the doctrine of reliance, and that for my point, I don't need to make the extra claim that this 
normative bite comes through reliance doctrine alone. I agree with his point, and mean to 
point to reliance doctrine here just because it is so rich in the rhetoric of social meaning, not 
because only it has that rhetoric. See, e.g., Balfour v. Balfour, L.R. 2 K.B. 571 (C.A. 1919), 
reprinted in FRIEDRICH KEsSLER ET AL., CONTRACTS 116-18 (3d ed. 1986). 
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At least in a court of law. But law is not the only normative 
authority within a community. Social norms also exist. These 
might well regulate the fickle promiser. The fickle promiser might 
suffer, in this well-integrated community, stigma or shame from 
leading another on through his word and then not carrying out what 
his word promised. 
This social mechanism might be quite effective, and subtle. 
Under some circumstances, it might well succeed in making harmful 
promising relatively infrequent. But at a certain stage, it might also 
disappear. As individuals within that community become more 
anonymous, or as the community becomes more heterogeneous, so-
cial mechanisms for disciplining inappropriate promising behavior 
give out.19 If such behavior is to continue to be regulated, some 
other mechanism must replace the failing social mechanisms. 
Enter the law. For as plainly as any doctrine in contract law, the 
reliance doctrine is a tool with which courts get to say what promis-
ing behavior is inappropriate, or appropriate. By enforcing 
promises that induced justifiable reliance, the court gets to punish 
inappropriate promising behavior, while leaving appropriate prom-
ising behavior alone. Law then replaces failed social mechanisms, 
mechanisms that before may have disciplined the same behavior, 
but that now don't. Law enters with all the good intentions of the 
state child welfare system, and with perhaps just about as much 
success.20 
It is the sport of first-year contracts to make fun of these efforts 
at making reliance enforceable. But if one can get beyond the 
sport, one sees in the opinions just what Post wants us to see in the 
judgments about privacy: one sees a claim about what is appropri-
ate promising, or contracting, behavior; a claim about how people 
are to behave. The function that this doctrine plays, no less than 
the doctrine of privacy, is to define how people like us are to be-
have;21 and to punish those who don't live up to those standards of 
civility. Perhaps more interestingly than tort, what we can observe 
in contract law is the law's replacing social norms, just when we 
might expect social norms to be giving out. The common law acts 
to buttress norms that before may have been supported by reputa-
19. See STEVEN L. NOCK, THE COSTS OF PRIVACY: SURVEILLANCE AND REPUTATION IN 
AMERICA (1993) {describing the rise of surveillance techniques). 
20. Cf. Eric A. Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal 
Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 133, 186-93 (1996) (discussing the effect of 
legal rules on nonns within families). 
21. The examples from contract Jaw are here many. See, e.g., Lumley v. Wagner, 42 Eng. 
Rep. 687, 693 (Ch. 1852) (stating why the court should impose liability on the Gennan de-
fendants in the case: "The exercise of this jurisdiction has, I believe, had a wholesome ten-
dency towards the maintenance of that good faith which exists in this country to a much 
greater degree perhaps than in any other"). 
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tion or practice, but that now, because of growing anonymity or 
heterogeneity, cannot be supported except by law. 
The law enters in contract then, just as with tort, with an expres-
sive function.22 Far more than the significance of the particular 
case, it enters to say something about what kind of contracting be-
havior will be respected, and what kinds not. It acts as a way of 
defining proper relations among members of a particular 
community. 
This is the point of Post's first move: to get us to see the com-
munity in what we would ordinarily think of as the individual - to 
see the community in tort, or contract, where before we would see 
the law as simply serving individual interests. The aim in emphasiz-
ing this collective is twofold: One part is to remind us of the role 
that these communities here play; the second is to make more stark 
a conflict that this role entails. For as romantic or nostalgic as a 
picture of community might be, it pulls against another part of who 
we are now. Whatever the place that this community has, we also 
understand that it doesn't define us fully, or more importantly, that 
no one community defines us fully. We are each individually consti-
tuted by more than one community; and we are collectively consti-
tuted by more than one community. No single community speaks 
for us as individuals, and no single community represents us as a 
political society. 
This raises the problem of limits. For as important as commu-
nity may be in defining who an individual is, no single community 
can gain complete control over the definition of an individual. 'I\vo 
kinds of space compete with community: First, space must be pre-
served for individual autonomy; and second, space must be assured 
for the competition among communities. It is this second point that 
focuses Post's second pass at the problem, in a chapter titled "Cul-
tural Heterogeneity and Law: Pornography, Blasphemy, and the 
First Amendment." If there are communities within which we are 
constituted, then there is more than one community within which 
we are so constituted. The problem that community talk presents 
then is how to understand this multiplicity. 
Here Post introduces a second trilogy of ideas, describing three 
ways of working this conflict of communities (p. 90). Or better, 
three ways of dealing with diversity within a community. The first 
is the technique of assimilationism - where one communal form 
enforces its conception of community upon all else. The second is 
the technique of pluralism, where the effort is to protect competing 
cultural forms from domination by any other. The third is the tech-
nique of individualism, which cares not at all about particular cul-
22. For an application in criminal law, see Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, 1lvo 
Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 CoLUM. L. REV. 269 (1996). 
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tural forms, but only ·about protecting the individual against the 
coercive enforcement of any particular cultural form upon him. 
Post illustrates these three attitudes in an extraordinarily rich 
discussion of, of all things, blasphemy law. He begins with blas-
phemy law in England, which itself began firmly rooted in an 
assimilationist tradition. Anyone questioning the truth of Christi-
anity was subject to the savage punishments of this regime (p. 95). 
Questioning the revealed truth of Christianity was a proxy for a 
more general moral turpitude, which, the state of England viewed, 
opened one up to proper punishment. 
This is a quaint story about old England. What makes it fasci-
nating is that the law of blasphemy continues in England to the 
present day. In 1977, for example, a gay journal was prosecuted for 
blasphemy, for questioning the Church's teachings with respect to 
homosexuality.23 The House of Lords upheld the conviction, but 
the central opinion, Post argues, was not assimilationist (p. 98). As 
Lord Scarman describes, what constitutes the wrong is not the ques-
tioning of the doctrine of Christianity; the wrong is questioning the 
doctrine in the wrong way (p. 100). What makes some speech blas-
phemy is that it questions another's religion in an insulting or ex-
treme manner, not that it simply questions another's religion. So 
understood, blasphemy law would protect not just the dominant 
culture's religion, but also every other religion. Here the founding 
value is no longer the dominant culture's, but rather a founding 
value of toleration. Here the competition among communities is 
resolved by the state preserving a certain peace among the combat-
ants, by punishing those who insult another's community (p. 98). 
America is not this culture of .toleration, however. America, 
that is, does not solve this problem of competing communities by 
protecting each community against the insult of another. Instead, 
America is the culture of individualism. Rather than the neutrality 
of peace among the combatants, the American strategy is to pre-
serve the right of any individual to criticize anyone at all. The state 
stands neutral here not by protecting the group against harm, but 
by protecting the individual against state-imposed punishment.24 
The American approach is represented in the case of Cantwell v. 
Connecticut. 25 Post begins by reminding us that though the First 
Amendment has been around since 1791, and though identically 
worded state constitutional provisions have been on the books since 
an earlier date, blasphemy has been a crime throughout America 
23. See Regina v. Lemon, 1979 App. Cas. 617, 660 (Lord Scarrnan). 
24. There is something a bit odd about this notion of neutrality when it is compared with 
an equivalent notion about property. Imagine that the state said it was being neutral with 
respect to distributions of property by refusing to coerce those who steal from others. 
25. 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
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up until just twenty years ago (p.102). Not until Cantwell do we get 
a very clear picture of just why blasphemy laws can no longer be 
enforced in the American context: Toleration, Cantwell says, can-
not constitutionally be enforced. An individual must have the right 
to question and attack a form of community, even a religious com-
munity, in whatever form he sees fit. For the right of the speaker is 
the right protected by the First Amendment (p. 104); and that right 
cannot yield to any conception of group interest protected by a 
principle of toleration. In America, free speech means the right of 
the individual to be free to attack groups, to use that attack to help 
reconstruct new groups (p. 105). 
The state will not be used to punish, through the force of law, 
any who might attack another group; that group must sustain itself 
through voluntary action, if it sustains itself at all (p. 138). The pic-
ture here is that a community gets made, if at all, through the vol-
untary action of individuals. 
This assumption about how community gets made - this pic-
ture of individuals reconstituting community - is a claim I return 
to in the section that follows. The assumption provides a transition 
between the first and second sections of the book - the transition 
from community to democracy. The first section is about how com-
munity is normative in the life of the individual, the second section, 
about democracy, is about how the individual must be protected 
from the community's normativity if he is to function properly 
within the democratic sphere. Democracy is the place where criti-
cal collective reflection goes on, and the question for constitutional-
ism is how much immunity the Constitution must grant to assure 
that this reflection can properly occur. 
Now again, the sense of "democracy" here is a bit counter-intui-
tive. Democracy does not refer to the processes or substance of 
collective deliberation. It refers to what we might call the necessary 
immunities that individuals must have to participate in this practice 
of democracy. From what do individuals have to remain free in or-
der to be properly free citizens within a democratic system? How 
free must individuals be from norms of civility so as to maintain 
space for public deliberation? 
Post introduces the question with a classic First Amendment 
conflict, Hustler v. Falwell. 26 Hustler had satirized Jerry Falwell, 
and his mother, in a nationally published pornographic magazine. 
The satire was by cartoon. No one could view the cartoon as 
"civil"; it was repulsive even from the perspective of those who 
least admire Falwell. But it was incivility directed against a public 
figure, and hence within the ambit of the New York Times doctrine. 
26. 485 U.S. 46 (1988). 
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Falwell tried to avoid the application of New York Times, by 
arguing that this cartoon was an intentional infliction of emotional 
distress. His gambit was thus to avoid the free speech doctrines all 
together, and embrace instead what Post calls the civility norms of 
the common law (p. 127). Any community requires civility norms; 
this publication ignored all of them. 
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by the newly-Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, reversed the Virginia court's finding of liability against 
Hustler. The mandate of the First Amendment, the Court held, was 
to facilitate the free flow of ideas and opinion on matters of public 
interest and concem.27 This mandate would run against rules di-
rectly regulating speech as well as rules indirectly regulating speech, 
such as the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. This 
protection, the Court held, did not depend upon the motivation of 
the speaker; it existed not just because it was opinion, but also be-
cause it was the attack of a public figure.28 Moreover, the protec-
tion was absolute because any other protection, relying upon a 
judgment of "outrageousness," would depend upon factors that are 
"inherently subjective."29 The "inherently subjective" is not the 
business of the state. 
There was a certain drama to the Hustler opinion, on the surface 
a ringing ACLU-ish endorsement of the First Amendment by a new 
conservative Chief Justice. But it didn't take much to see that the 
opinion couldn't really be taken seriously as a staterp.ent of consti-
tutional principle. For the principle had no limit. In its absolutism, 
it wipes away precisely what Post defends as the state's place in 
constructing community. If the attempt to define norms of "outra-
geousness" was too subjective, what justified this effort of commu-
nities more generally? 
Hustler is the rejection of defamation law's foundations. Defa-
mation in the common law tradition had a twin origin. It began 
both as a criminal action, and also as a civil action (p. 129). Truth 
was a defense only in the civil action, which meant that the criminal 
action was concerned only with assuring that speech didn't invade 
dignity interests, whether true or not (p. 130). Some things could 
not be said in the common law regime, because saying them was not 
considered civil. 
The function of this criminal regime then was public, not pri-
vate. It was about maintaining a certain kind of public discourse; 
about maintaining a certain civility within this public discourse. 
The civil regime was different. It was designed more to compensate 
for wrongful accusations. Truth, therefore, was relevant to this de-
27. See 485 U.S. at 50. 
28. See 485 U.S. at 51. 
29. See 485 U.S. at 55. 
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termination. So that the defamed who was defamed with the truth 
could gain no private gain from this defamation. The only action 
for such a victim was the public action. 
Post recounts the slow evolution of the common law to merge 
these two actions. The first Restatement, for example, replicated the 
distinction between civil and criminal by creating one tort, focused 
on civility, and another, focused on false statements.30 In 1974, 
"ridicule" was added to the Restatement, further refining the civility 
notion.31 Speech that was essentially ridicule, .that was essentially 
uncivil, would not, under this regime, gain constitutional protection. 
This evolution was terminated, however, the very same year. In 
1974, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,32 the Supreme Court defini-
tively shifted the tort to a concern for truth alone. The only speech 
that could, constitutionally, be proscribed was false speech; ridicule 
when based upon opinion was constitutionally protected (p. 131). 
This clear extermination of civility notions within defamation 
forced the displacement of the values protected by that tort to other 
torts - in particular, the privacy tort, and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. In both torts, now "outrageousness" replaced 
ridicule; the question was whether the behavior, though speech be-
havior, was so outrageous as to violate norms of civility thought 
fundamental (p. 129). 
Hustler brings Gertz to this displaced civility tort of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress. Now here as well, even with speech 
behavior deemed outrageous, no proscription through law can be 
permitted constitutionally. We must stand by and let the market 
control this vileness. Why? The Court's account is almost Borkish: 
it is that any effort to proscribe the "outrageous" would be too un-
principled, too "subjective," for law.33 But if Post is to follow Hus-
tler, he can't follow it for reasons like these. Post can't reject these 
reasons because they are "subjective." Indeed, the great strength of 
Post's work is to show the space between the subjective and the 
objective within constitutional thought. What defines community 
standards is neither the objective nor subjective; what defines com-
munity standards is a particular judgment of a community - local, 
so not objective; collective, so not subjective (p. 134). 
Post then needs a different account to make sense of the consti-
tutional protection granted to "public discourse." Public discourse, 
as Post defines it, is a discourse that "encompass[es] the communi-
30. See George C. Christie, Defamatory Opinions and the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 
75 MICH. L. REV. 1621, 1625-28 (1977). 
31. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 567A (Tent. Draft No. 20, 1974). 
32. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
33. See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 41 IND. 
L.J. 1, 8 (1971). 
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cative processes necessary for the formation of public opinion" 
(p. 302). Stated most abstractly, his argument is this. Speech 
deemed within the realm of "public discourse" may be subject to 
neither norms of the community domain nor norms of the manage-
rial domain. Instead, such speech must be free of collective norms 
generally. For this speech, the individual must be granted a consti-
tutional immunity; she must be left free from state coercion. 
Post is describing the necessary space for critical thought. Life is 
about - the metaphors here are endless - moving between living 
and thinking critically about how we should live; it is about acting 
on the stage, and then stepping off the stage to think about how life 
on the stage should proceed. When one is in this critical mode, it 
makes no sense that the norms of the life one is thinking critically 
about should limit the ability to think critically. Here, in this space 
for critical thought, and action, one must be free of these norms. It 
follows that the norms of community that otherwise define one's 
life must be, in a sense, shut off when one is thinking about how one 
should live one's life. 
This picture of reflection is everywhere in critical thought. It 
has a naYve version, and a not-so-naYve version. The naYve version 
is expressed by a regret in a novel by Milan Kundera.34 Says 
Kundera: 
We can never know what to want, because, living only one life, we can 
neither compare it with our previous lives nor perfect it in our lives to 
come .... There is no means of testing which decision is better, be-
cause there is no basis for comparison. We live everything as it 
comes, without warning, like an actor going on cold.35 
But who would do the picking among these various lives? Which is 
the person who gets to live all the other lives, and then choose the 
life that is best? For choice is made within a life, and if the person 
selecting the life is without all lives, then he has nothing with which 
to make this choice. Likewise with the space within which one 
stands when one is critical about life within community: One does 
not stand outside any community; one is not free of all normative 
judgments; one is not defined as the person who has no life. That 
person could not reflect on life within a community, because, like 
the character in Kundera's novel, that person would have no life 
with which to make this reflection. 
The not-so-naYve version is thus more limited. Public discourse, 
under this version, is a place where the individual can say what he 
or she wants, without fear of government censorship, or direct pun-
ishment for views expressed. The immunity that democracy must 
34. MILAN KUNDERA, THE UNBEARABLE LIGHTNESS OF BEING 8 (Michael Henry Heim 
trans., 1984). 
35. Id. 
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provide is against one kind of punishment only. It is not an immu-
nity from every sort of punishment, or every form of life. The com-
munity may properly hate your ideas; they just may not lock you up 
for them. 
Public discourse is thus an importantly limited critical practice. 
It is limited first because the thing it is directed most firmly against 
- state censorship - may in this world be quite a tiny danger. 
Second, the thing it ignores when granting this immunity - social 
sanction - is really quite great. Compare two techniques for regu-
lating pornography: one that bans the sale and distribution of por-
nography, the other that publishes the names of consumers of 
pornography.36 It is not plain that the first is a more effective tech-
nique for regulating pornography than the second. Yet only one is 
on the First Amendment's screen. 
In the second part of this essay, I want to return to this point 
about the limits of this principle against censorship. My point here 
is just to emphasize the smallness of the space that this public dis-
course model wants to open up. The idea is that we must immunize 
individuals in their effort to attack existing structures, so that com-
munities are formed from the voluntary associations that these at-
tacks may produce. There is, Post says, a marketplace of 
community. Within this marketplace, individuals compete to form, 
and reform, social groups. Law, within this marketplace, must re-
main neutral among the many groups that may get made. Neutral 
then means not interfering with private power.37 
Post is describing a balance, not a foundation. He is giving a 
reason why one kind of punishment may not be applied to speech, 
but he is not giving an argument why all norms of civility should be 
displaced. Indeed, the richness of his account here is just its appre-
ciation of the tension between this principle of public discourse and 
the construction of community. This is a tension that cannot be 
avoided, and that de.fines, as he describes it, the paradox of public 
discourse: public discourse must "blunt" rules of civility if it is to 
assure a critical space within which reflection about community life 
can occur (p. 301). Yet if it blunts these rules of civility too much, it 
will undercut the very community that it criticizes. Once again we 
have a tension that cannot and should not be resolved. It is a ten-
sion that must be sustained, between open space for speech, and a 
closed space for building the conditions of a community. 
The domain of democracy is about a limit on the scope of com-
munity, it is about when norms of community must be suspended so 
36. Cf. Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. Cm. L. REV. (forth-
coming 1996). 
37. Again, compare this point with the same point made, supra note 24, about the state's 
power vis-a-vis property. 
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that a critical space may be preserved. This is the very same ques-
tion raised in the third section of Post's book, describing the man-
agement domain (pp. 197-289). But here the norms are 
instrumental, not constitutive. Just as there is a domain, the domain 
of community, where norms of a community operate to coerce an 
individual into being a certain sort, so too is there a domain, the 
domain of management, where instrumental norms coerce an indi-
vidual into doing things of a certain sort. These are both places 
where the individual is, for these different reasons, not free; and 
they are both domains that, because of both kinds of unfreedom, 
must, in principled ways, be limited. Stalinist Russia was a place 
where people lived exclusively within the domain of management. 
An Amish village is a place where people live exclusively within the 
domain of community. We live in a place where people move 
among all three, and the question for constitutional law is how to 
draw the boundaries to preserve all three. 
Post describes two contexts within which the limits of the do-
main of management get raised - the first, the public forum doc-
trine; the second, the scope of "collectivist" free speech doctrine 
(pp. 199, 268). I will discuss only the first at any length. 
The question for public forum doctrine is just this. There are 
places that the government owns. It regulates access to them, it 
determines the activities that occur within them. The public forum 
doctrine asks whether there are limits on this power of governmen-
tal control. 
The pattern of the solution should now be familiar. Post asks us 
first to discriminate - to distinguish the ends to which governmen-
tal regulation in a public forum is a means. If the ends are manage-
rial, if they are directed at legitimately managing objects properly 
within the government's domain, then the First Amendment limits 
on the government's techniques should be small. If the ends are 
not managerial, if the speech is speech about governance, then the 
First Amendment limitations on the government's power should be 
great (pp. 237, 245). 
Post's analysis parallels the "Court's decisions dealing with the 
internal management of speech" (p. 244). The question is: What 
are the limits on the government's ability to manage the expression 
of the people it employs? In both contexts, the question is about 
how the government's power should be limited, given the compet-
ing interests of the public space. In both contexts, the analysis is 
just the mirror image of the one 'used to answer the ·same' questions 
asked about the scope of community norms. 
The answer in both cases looks to the proper managerial role 
being served by the government institution, and to whether the reg-
ulation at issue reasonably serves this regulative role (p. 245). This 
1442 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 94:1422 
is different from the Grayned3S approach, which asks simply what is 
the government's interest in regulating the speech at issue, and 
whether that interest gets outweighed by the speakers' interest. It 
is different because it is not thinking about these interests in the 
abstract; it is placing them within particular institutional structures. 
Within those institutional structures, the question is what sort of 
end the speech restriction serves. If it is a properly managerial end, 
then the institution gets a form of deference in its judgment about 
the scope of the speech restriction, if indeed granting deference is 
an appropriate, or necessary, feature of this institution. 
The approach here just patterns the approach in the second sec-
tion of the book. For just as there the question was how much 
space must the individual have vis-a-vis the community, here the 
question is how much space must the individual have vis-a-vis the 
government-as-manager. What is driving both is a competing vision 
of a properly regulated domain - whether community or manage-
ment - and the proper space to be left open from that domain -
where the individual cannot be made subject to the commands of 
the regulated domain. Again, what is sustaining the conflict is the 
notion that neither domain can be eliminated: both must sustain 
themselves, this tension notwithstanding. The necessity of this ten-
sion, the way in which it sustains the lives it opposes, the richness it 
allows - this is the lesson Post wants to teach. 
* * * 
There's a place in cyberspace called LamdaMOO - a MOO, or 
a MUD, one of thousands of MUDs in cyberspace, places where 
people play out roles, or games, where they define their own char-
acters, and environments that, because played in a virtual world, 
stick.39 A person enters LamdaMOO however he wishes, as a man, 
or a woman, or a fish; with an attitude, or a question, or a longing; 
with a purpose, or just wandering; for a short time, or for years. 
What happens in this virtual space is what happens in real space, 
but this virtual space is much more plastic than the real world -
for again, who one is is subject to definition; and the world one 
plays in is subject to manipulation. One can design oneself to be a 
cat, and then design this cat such that if a bird flies into the room, 
the cat will meow. This cat that meows, then, interacts with others 
in this space - which means talks with others, or walks with others, 
or flirts. 
38. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972). 
39. MUD stands for a "Multiuser Dungeon;" a MOO is a "MUD, Object Oriented." See 
Lawrence Lessig, The Path of Cyberlaw, 104 YALE L.J. 1743, 1747 n.11 (1995). LamdaMOO 
is well-described in Julian Dibbell, A Rape in Cyberspace, VILLAGE VOICE, Dec. 21, 1993, at 
36. 
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It is slowly becoming impossible to ignore these places of cyber-
space. What they are doing to individuals who live in them is ex-
traordinary, yet largely unknown.4o They are engines of 
multiplicity, and maybe duplicity; machines that facilitate the living 
of many lives. And unlike the many lives that most in modem soci-
ety live all the time - awaking a lover, making breakfast as a 
mother, racing to work as a lawyer, etc. - this multiplicity occurs 
simultaneously. On one screen one can have many windows, and in 
each window, one can play a different character. As one male 
player describes it: 
I split my mind. I'm getting better at it. I can see myself as being two 
or three or more. And I just turn on one part of my mind and then 
another when I go from window to window. I'm in some kind of ar-
gument in one window, and trying to come on to a girl in a MUD in 
another, and another window might be running a spreadsheet pro-
gram .... [Real Life] is just one more window and it's not usually my 
best one.41 
Whatever else this amazingly bizarre world does, it does help us 
see something that is central to the argument that Post presents. 
First, it helps us see life within this community. For however odd, 
or frightening, one imagines that the life of these MUDers is, it is 
plain that what they do in this elaborate game is construct an iden-
tity and a society through extensive interaction over time. They 
build, that is, a community. They may choose who they are as they 
enter the MUD, but over time who they are gains a kind of social 
capital. They gain this capital through extensive conversation with 
others in this space. Indeed for many, this is the closest contact 
they have with others in a community. The games have logic; the 
players play subject to that logic; they play over times, and through 
time, that logic, and who they have been, sink in. One becomes 
that person, however one becomes a person, that one plays in 
cyberspace; his identity is in some way linked to the character. 
But this community also helps us see two other critical parts to 
Post's account, one implied, one express. The implied is the place 
for the individual, independent of these roles, and here the technol-
ogy magnifies the sense in which we imagine, or hope, that an indi-
vidual is something other than what these communities define. 
There is a person separate from the character(s) he or she plays. 
Not wholly separate - we might worry about what the games do to 
the person in real life, and we might hope that the person in real life 
(RL) has some effect on the people in the games - but separate 
enough. 
40. For an exceptional first "introduction, see SHERRY TURKLE, LIFE ON THE SCREEN 
(1995). 
41. Id. at 13. 
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The express part in Post's account is the place for democracy, 
and here is where LamdaMOO becames so instructive. For as well 
as there being individuals outside the games, there is a collective 
outside of the games. The collective is all those who play the 
games, and they became a collective in the sense Post means when 
they deliberate collectively about how life in the MOO shall 
proceed. 
In LamdaMOO, such. a _collective exists. After a particularly 
evil sort did a grossly awful thing to a number of people in a living 
room one night,42 the Wizards of LamdaMOO built democracy into 
the world of LamdaMOO. This was a space - call it a domain -
where people discuss propositions for regulating this community. 
These propositions are voted upon, through an extensive balloting 
process, and these ballots then determine life in the community. 
The link to Post here is this: that when one is in this place where 
democracy is the rule, one is outside the particular communities 
that one has up to then been living. One can step outside one's 
character to debate what rules should collectively govern these 
communities; no game can tie one up so that one is silent in this 
public space. 
The game-playing stops, then, in two very different ways. One is 
when a person leaves the space to return to RL; the other is when 
one leaves the game, to discuss what rules should govern the space 
generally. When one leaves for RL, one returns an individual; 
when one leaves for the discussion, one begins a process of collec-
tive deliberation.43 
Though few have lived it, I suggest that our intuitions are well-
trained in a case like this. I think we all see the need to preserve 
this balance of spaces - the need to preserve either the retreat to 
an individual space, or the advance to a collective space where rules 
of the MUD get· made. The question is how much of these two 
kinds of escapes there must be to assure that this middle place 
doesn't get out of control. 
This is the balance that Post is pointing us to, I suggest, in two 
different ways. In the one way, it is about the relationship among 
the individual, community, and democracy. In the second, it is 
about the relationship among the individual, management, and de-
mocracy. These are precisely parallel problems, both about how 
much this middle domain - community and management -
should be allowed to control an individual, and the collective made 
up of these individuals. The community is one space where individ-
uals live; it is a space where the individual must be free to some 
42. Described in Dibbell, supra note 39. 
43. Cf. p. 7 ("The essential problematic of democracy thus lies in the reconciliation of 
individual and collective autonomy."). 
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extent to determine whether this community is where she wants to 
live; and the community must be free, to some extent, of the con-
straints of the community to determine whether this community is 
how the community wants it to be. Thus the pull of the individual 
space and democracy at both ends of community. 
The same pull exists in the domain of management, for manage-
ment, like community, is a structure for controlling individual and 
communal life. It must be left open for the individual to question 
his participation in this structure, and left open for the community 
to question the structure itself. Its tensions, though in substance 
different, are in form the same as community tensions, and the ten-
sions of LamdaMOO. The practice for resolving them is the gen-
eral practice that Post has displayed. And described. And 
recommends. 
II. QUESTIONS 
My aim in the first part was to describe. My purpose here is to 
question. I focus on four questions, moving from the less significant 
to the more. These are not limits of one author; they are limits of a 
constitutional culture. For again, my view is that the practice Post 
has described is the best that constitutional law can be; but it may 
well be that constitutional law cannot be very much. At least for us, 
at least just now. 
A. How To Defend Borders 
Running throughout this book is the idea of multiplicity over 
unity. That we should see the differences in the contexts within 
which First Amendment norms must apply, rather than speaking as. 
if all were the same. That w&-should understand the different forms 
of life necessary to sustain democratic self-government, and build a 
regime that can support these differences. There may be just one 
First Amendment, but we need a rich understanding of that amend-
ment to help us navigate these different domains of social life. 
The hard question is drawing the boundaries - finding a way 
convincingly to place one sort of activity within one domain, and to 
distinguish it from activities in another. Post's aim is to focus on 
this "largely unappreciated struggle[ ] ... about how the boundaries 
between distinct realms are to be fixed" (p. 2). But the focus is on 
techniques for a court. It is a court that will make the distinctions 
that this richer theory demands. A question then might be whether 
the tools that Post provides give courts the capacity to so 
distinguish. 
In Post's view, this challenge is a difficult one. The problem 
with courts is that they are too thick-thumbed .about the matter. 
The pattern is familiar: academics give the Court a fairly rich 
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model for understanding, and applying, First Amendment doctrine; 
the Court selects a fairly clumsy and crude model instead. 
Public forum doctrine is a good example. Public forum doctrine 
gets born in an ambiguity. Both in its founding opinion, Hague, 44 
and in its announcing law review article by Harry Kalven,45 it is 
never quite clear whether what makes something a public forum -
and hence a place where the government's ability to manage speech 
is constrained - is something about the property itself, or some-
thing about the nature of the government's interest in regulating 
speech within that property. The theoretically unrespectable posi-
tion is the position that makes this turn on something about the 
property itself - whether, for example, it has always been dedi-
cated to the public, or whether it is a street, or park, or any other 
such contingent and theoretically irrelevant fact. The theoretically 
respectable position is the latter position - that the status turns on 
something in the nature of the government's interest in regulating 
speech. In line with this respectable position, at least one Supreme 
Court case articulated a fairly respectable test: As the Court said in 
Grayned, the question has nothing to do with the kind of govern-
mental property at issue (p. 209); it is simply that if government 
property is at issue, then the government must show that its interest 
in regulating the speech outweighs the burden the regulation im-
poses on the speech. An exercise of power to silence then must 
always be based on a justification referring to the nature of the gov-
ernment interest. 
Post likes neither approach. He doesn't like the "kinds of prop-
erty" approach because it is a conclusion in search of a theory. He 
doesn't like the Grayned approach because it is not sufficiently re-
spectful of the proper management role that government might 
have within a properly managerial domain. As I described before, 
in Post's view, the question is whether the speech restriction is nec-
essary to a legitimate governmental purpose; and if it is, then courts 
should defer to that decision, to ensure that authority is maintained 
where authority is necessary. 
With this I agree. The problem is in the next step. For from the 
fact that Post has identified what is plausibly a better account of and 
justification for existing public forum doctrine cases, he wants to 
infer that public forum doctrine should now be reconceived explic-
itly along these lines. Once we know the contours of the constitu-
tional doctrine, he says, we should adopt a constitutional approach 
that makes those contours clear. Rather than this collection of 
crude approximations at a constitutional theory, we should embrace 
44. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939). 
45. Harry Kalven, Jr., The Concept of the Public Forum· Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SuP. CT. 
REV. 1. 
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an approach that explicitly recognizes the constitutional values at 
stake, and determines them (p. 17). 
It is this step that I think we must pause upon. For it has within 
it an assumption that is common within constitutional theory and, I 
suggest, commonly wrong. This is the assumption that transparency 
is costless; that direction always trumps indirection; that the best 
way to deal with conflict and ambiguity is openness, and honesty; 
that struggles are best on the surf(l_ce .. , 
These may be good maxims for life, or maybe for love. I want 
to suggest that we think more carefully about whether they make 
much sense when applied to the work of the Court. Post's theory 
shows us that the lines the Court must draw are lines right in the 
midst of a great struggle.46 They define the area of,contestability.47 
They represent just where our intuitions about the separate do-
mains give out. It is here the Court must do its work. But granting 
all that, does it follow that the Court must do its work openly? 
This may·sound like an odd question, but its answer is infected 
with a related oddness. Why, we might ask, is the Court so clumsy? 
Why, given a choice between two understandings of the public fo-
rum doctrine, does it pick the dumber of the two? There is an an-
swer to this question, I suggest, and it resonates beyond simple 
intelligence, or politics. The answer is tied to something we cannot 
ignore about the institutional position of the Court. Think about 
the rhetorical position of the Court executing each of the public 
forum doctrine tests. In one test, the Court must articulate the rela-
tive strength of two highly contested values, and it then must decide 
which value is more important than the other. In the other test, the 
Court must report on whether a particular place is a "traditional 
public forum." Which test is the easier of the two to apply? Not 
easier in the sense of which is intellectually less difficult, but easier 
in the sense of rhetorically less burdensome. 
The answer to that depends upon the rhetorical costs for each 
question, and what these are depends upon the institution in ques-
tion. If it were a legislature confronting the question, there would 
be relatively little cost in openly saying that it was resolving a con-
flict of values through its own majority vote. The same is not true 
of a court. While it is to be expected that a legislature will confront 
46. Cf. p. 14 ("The location of that boundary will no doubt be unstable and 
contestable."). 
47. This is not to say that all nonns are contestable, or even that they are "typically con-
testable." Seep. 183. I think it is a mistake to equate contestability with normativity. This is 
at the core of RENFORD BAMBROUGH, MORAL SCEPTICISM AND MORAL KNOWLEDGE 
(1979). It does not follow from the fact that a social meaning is a "political issue" that "like 
... all political issues" it must be regarded as "indeterminate." P. 307. Social meanings, like 
social norms, can be contestable or not, determinate or not, and in the main are far more 
uncontested and determinate than we think. 
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conflicting values, and expected that over time its resolution of that 
conflict will change, it delegitimates the position of a court for it to 
be seen openly to confront a conflict of values; it undermines its 
institutional position for it to embrace a test for resolving such con-
flicts that can't help over time appearing to be merely the result of 
politics. The social meaning of a legislature is politics; the social 
meaning of a court is not. 
What distinguishes the two public forum tests is just this differ-
ence in how each will make the Court appear. One test is truer to 
First Amendment values, yet the Court's application of that test 
would constitute a form of rhetorical self-immolation. The other 
test is logically unrelated to the First Amendment values, yet it can 
be applied in a way that preserves the Court's appearance of 
neutrality. 
This difference, I suggest, matters. It matters because in the se-
lection of a test to enforce systematically constitutional values, the 
Court can't help but consider its own institutional burden in apply-
fug this test. When the institutional burden is great, the Court will 
select away from that test. When the institutional burden is slight, 
the Court might select that test, even though its articulation, or 
elaboration, of the constitutional value underlying the test is infer-
ior to the elaboration of another test. Fidelity to constitutional 
principle is just one value in the Court's collection of values, and we 
have seen enough to know that at times it is sacrificed in the name 
of an institutional interest. 
What makes a test costly? It is not that the test involves "val-
ues" rather than facts. What matters is whether the value or facts 
involved in the test are, in the present circumstance, contested, es-
pecially in ways that appear to reach outside the legal domain. It is 
the contestedness of the terms of a test that render it costly for a 
court to apply. For it is contestedness that makes it difficult for the 
Court to apply the test in way that will seem consistent (p. 15). In-
consistency is the simplest signal that perhaps something other than 
law is going on, and what the Court needs to do is to select tests 
that rarely produce that signal. 
We need to account for this dimension of constitutional practice 
more fully than we do. It is a focus that has a long pedigree in 
constitutional theory. Felix Frankfurter was an important exponent 
of the concern;48 Robert Bork in our own day continues that obses-
sion. 49 But the reason for our focus on this dimension need not be 
that we believe the questions that· are contested have no answers. 
Contestedness is relevant, in other words, not because the domain 
of the contested is subjective, or incapable of rational judgment. 
48. See, e.g., FEux FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 22, 58 {1937). 
49. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 26 {1978). 
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That was Bork's view, but it is not mine. Contestedness is unre-
lated to the ontological status of the matter contested. We all, I am 
sure, have views about abortion that we each believe true. None-
theless, we all understand that views about abortion are contested. 
The contestability might (read: should) make us a bit more humble 
about the forcefulness with which we assert our views. But it 
doesn't on its own undermine the judgment we might have that cer-
tain views are true, or not. 
Contestedness is relevant to a court not because it identifies the 
subjective, but because it mar}:cs out that space where, in the present 
interpretive context, there is no clear link between (a) an authorita-
tive legal text and (b) one or another view of a contested matter. 
Reasonable people may differ, and in such a context, what the 
Court wants first is a way to resolve the question without disagree-
ing with reasonable people. It wants, that is, a test that draws away 
the political cost of one decision over the other. 
What this should suggest, I want to argue~ is an institutional rea-
son why we can observe these dunderheaded doctrines of constitu-
tional law - doctrines that have no apparent connection with 
underlying constitutional values, but that nonetheless seem to per-
sist. The reason is this account of institutional cost. The Court, or 
Justices on the Court, feel this cost just as they feel the cost of sexist 
speech in their opinions, and change their opinions accordingly. 
Contestedness has a kind of stigma associated with it, and these 
well-socialized Justices avoid this stigma as they avoid stigmas of 
every other kind. 
Which brings us back to Post. For what all tJtls should suggest is 
a certain incompleteness in the plan that Post presynts. It is no 
doubt important, at the level of theory, to identify completely the 
contours of constitutional doctrine. It is an advance to show, for 
example, that there are three sides, not one. It is important, in ar-
ticulating this theory, to show just how the theory fits with existing 
practice. But that is just the first step of constitutional theory. For 
theory must be translated into practice, and one unavoidable di-
mension of practice is this constraint on the tools the Court can 
deploy. What an elegant theory of constitutional la'\,¥ needs is a 
dunderheaded way to apply it. What it needs are tools of practice 
that can be used to advance the constitutional values at issue with-
out undermining the institutional position o~ the Co~rt. 
It is not an answer to the dunderheads simply to say that the 
Court should "struggle openly" ab0ut these values. Struggling 
openly about constitutional values has a social meaning in this insti-
tutional context that, for a court, may be self-defeating. We might 
question the social meaning, we might want it to be otherwise. But 
a question and wish does not remake a social practice. It will take 
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much more than rich theory to move our constitutional culture off 
this debilitating skepticism. 
B. What's Speech Got To Do with It? 
It is easy for us, as lawyers, to think that law is terribly impor-
tant. 50 It is easier, as well-socialized sorts, to think that the sanction 
of law is the only real sanction within our society. People don't get 
condemned by the church much any more; dueling has apparently 
died. So we are left, it may seem, with a world where the only limits 
on our freedom are the limits set by the market and by the law. We 
may think that beyond that, we are essentially free. 
Part of Post's purpose in the first part of his book is to dislodge 
just this view. At the core of his account is the community. But 
community is, as Post describes, not where we live; it is instead a 
form of life in part constituted by a structure of sanctions. If we 
don't see community's sanctions because we have become so well-
socialized, then this is a function of blindness, and not nonexistence. 
Our steps are guided as much by these social sanctions as by legal 
sanctions; no doubt more. Quoting Sabina Lovibond, Post writes: 
"[T]he norms implicit in a community's ... social practices are 'up-
held,' in quite a material sense, by the sanctions which the commu-
nity can bring to bear upon deviant individuals."51 One question 
Post's account might raise is just what place this nonlegal structure 
of sanctions should have in the law's account of the First 
Amendment. 
To answer this question, we should think a bit more generally 
about community - about what it does, or what it provides, to the 
individuals within it. Among the many things that a community 
might provide are a class of things we might call collective goods. 
Collective goods are goods that can benefit everyone in the commu-
nity if anyone at all; and they are goods that no individual alone 
would have a sufficient incentive to provide.52 I am not saying that 
communities provide just collective goods; they also provide indi-
vidual goods. But the class of goods that provides the greatest 
trouble is the class of collective goods, and these are the focus 
below. 
To provide these collective goods, communities use sanctions. 
Some sanctions are legal - the collective good of security from 
violence is supported by criminal sanctions against violence. But 
most sanctions are nonlegal; they get their force from mechanisms 
50. This thought no doubt inspired Robert Ellickson's ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How 
NEIGHBORS SETILE DISPUTES (1991) 
51. P. 147 (quoting SABINA LoVIBOND, REALISM AND IMAGINATION IN ETHICS 61 (1983) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
52. See Posner, supra note 20, at 137-42 (discussing collective goods). 
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outside the law. Attribution of bad reputation, or shaming, or ex-
clusion - these are all the techniques of social sanction, all 
deployed within a community to control, as much as possible, be-
havior within this community.53 
The fact that such social sanctions are not "legal sanctions" 
should not suggest that they are any less significant or forceful. 
There is as much violence in ostracism as in a civil fine. Indeed, for 
many the fear of social sanction is far more effective than the fear 
of legal sanction. It is easier for me to imagine committing a felony 
- well, some felonies - than it is for me to imagine crossing some 
of the silliest social lines.54 Social sanctions and legal sanctions are 
not ordered in some hierarchy of significance or force; there are 
extremes on both sides of this line. Both work to· constrain individ-
uals to contribute to the supply of collective goods. 
These social mechanisms function in part through what we 
might call the device of social meaning. By "social meaning" I 
mean a name and a price given to an action, inaction, or status that 
(a) in a particular community has a well-defined association 
(whether positive, or negative, or neutral) and that (b) is internal-
ized by a significant portion of the community with which the 
meaning is a social meaning, such that people feel the appropriate 
association when the social meaning is uttered.55 So, for example: 
"not telling the truth" we call "lying." "Lying" has a social meaning 
if (a) it has a well-defined association (here we would imagine nega-
tive) and (b) this association is to some degree internalized by peo-
ple within our community, such that people ordinarily feel some 
psychological cost if they lie and, all things being equal, they feel 
the appropriate response to someone else lying. Or again: "throw-
ing trash to the ground" we call "littering." "Littering" has a social 
meaning if (a) there is a well-defined association with the act of 
littering and (b) people have internalized that association both with 
themselves and with others. 
It should be clear that (a) and (b) don't necessarily run together. 
Littering is a good example. There was a time when "littering" was 
just becoming a social issue - when people started discussing its 
53. This is the focus of the Chicago School. See Kahan, supra note 36; Cass Sunstein, 
Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 CoLUM. L. REv. {forthcoming 1996). 
54. See p. 75 (" 'The dread of public censure and disgrace is not only the most effectual, 
and therefore the most important, but in numberless instances the only security which society 
possesses for the preservation of decency and the performance of the private duties of life.' ") 
(quoting THOMAS STARKIE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SLANDER, LIBEL, SCANDALUM 
MAGNATUM, AND FALSE RUMORS xx-xxi (1826)). 
55. For a more robust definition of social norms, see Philip Pettit, Virtus Normativa: Ra-
tional Choice Perspectives, 100 Ennes 725, 751 (1990); see also Jon Elster, Norms of Revenge, 
100 Ennes 862, 864 (1990). For a discussion of the difference between norms and meaning, 
see Lawrence Lessig, Social Meaning and Social Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2181 (1996); 
Sunstein, supra note 53. 
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social cost - but when people still felt quite unabashed about lit-
tering. Eventually, the unabashedness disappeared. After exten-
sive public campaigns, there was not only a clear association with 
the act of littering (i.e., negative), but more and more, people had 
internalized that association, such that they felt a cost when litter-
ing, and they felt negatively toward those who litter. The same 
story might be told about smoking.56 
When (a) and (b) do run together, however, the social meanings 
they together de.fine function within that society selectively to re-
ward or punish individuals who partake in that action, or inaction, 
or status.57 They function, that is, to change the cost of different 
behavior. If they change this cost efficiently, then they make the 
benefit of a stigmatized action less then its cost, or, for a socially 
desirable action, the benefit more than its cost. Social meanings, 
that is, function here to supplement the individual cost or provide 
an individual benefit, so as to induce the individual to behave in 
one way or the other. 
In this way then, some social meanings solve collective action 
problems, and thereby help provide collective goods. If a clean en-
vironment is a collective good, but providing it presents a collective 
action problem, then the stigma associated with littering can help 
provide that collective good. The same can be said about lying .. If a 
community within which trust exists is a collective good, then pro-
viding it presents a collective action problem. The stigma associ-
ated with lying helps impose a cost on individuals who deviate from 
the norm of being truthful. Social meanings are semiotic tools for 
regulating individual behavior, often to help induce individuals to 
contribute to a collective good's supply. 
Social meanings, then, are prices. They are just one of any 
number of different prices that an action might incur. Battering 
someone opens oneself up to the cost of criminal sanction; it also 
opens oneself up to the cost of social sanction. Depending upon 
who the person is, the costs of the latter could well exceed the costs 
of the former. But regardless of the person, in most societies, the 
action exacts both costs. 
These structures might be said to constitute the techniques of a 
community. They also lead us to focus on a central oddity in Post's 
account. What Post's work does as well as any in First Amendment 
thought is point to the extremely rich structure of social control that 
any mature ~ociety has. His account of the civility norms highlights 
just how a society depends upon the social mechanisms of control, 
56. See SMOKING PouCY: LAw, Pouncs, AND CULTURE (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen 
D. Sugannan eds., 1993). 
57. I discuss this at greater length in Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 
62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943 (1995). 
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as well as legal mechanisms of control, and how both function to-
gether to sanction deviance within a particular community. His use 
of material from sociology and anthropology points us to a very rich 
literature that makes plain the place of each. The two combine to 
help constrain individuals such that a particular kind of community 
can be constructed. The state uses both legal and social sanctions to 
achieve its ends, and it constructs both legal and social sanctions to 
achieve its ends. 
Against this background - against the background of an ex-
tremely rich array of techniques used by the state to achieve state 
ends, some of which succeed by making actions stigmatizing or by 
invoking existing structures of stigma to increase the costs of these 
actions - just what the First Amendment is about begins to seem a 
difficult question. There is the First Amendment of Barnette, with 
its one "fixed star" - that in our constitutional constellation, "no 
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in poli-
tics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citi-
zens to confess by word or act their faith therein."58 But this plainly 
is not our First Amendment. The state does not stick to legal sanc-
tions; it uses social sanctions and legal sanctions interchangeably. 
Indeed it sometimes prefers social sanctions, as these are likely to 
be less expensive.59 Neither does it stic~ to existing social sanc-
tions; it works to reformulate these social sanctions to make them 
better serve state ends. Social sanctions function by establishing a 
certain orthodoxy around a given behavior. The state uses this or-
thodoxy, it helps support it, it relies upon it, and it develops it. 
Mucking around with what's right and wrong, good and bad, just 
and unjust, is just one part of what the state does all the time. 
Post should puzzle this more. For against this background, 
there's something quite odd about the very particular, and quite 
narrow, focus of the First Amendment's protections. Throughout 
Post's account, the story we are told is that the First Amendment's 
aim is to force the government to remain neutral among these dif-
fering conceptions of the good (p. 303), that the government re-
mains neutral when it refuses to sanction, or punish - and here 
legal sanction is what is meant - speech that deviates from some 
reigning social orthodoxy. 
But against the background I have just sketched, this focus 
seems both too narrow and too broad. It is too narrow because if 
the purpose of the First Amendment restrictions were really simply 
to assure government neutrality in this marketplace of communi-
ties, then why may government muck around with the price of 
membership in these various communities in all the other social-
58. West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). 
59. See Kahan, supra note 36, at 630-52. 
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meaning management ways that the government mucks around 
with social meaning? Censorship through legal sanction is just one 
technique of social-meaning management; it isn't even plain that it 
is the most powerful technique. (Indeed, I believe a strong argu-
ment exists that in this society, it is one of the weakest techniques of 
social-meaning management.) Given the range of techniques avail-
able for changing the price of various communities, limiting the 
government's use of this s_ingle technique, while not considering at 
all any of the other meaning-management techniques, is like 
prohibiting murder by stabbing, but leaving unsanctioned any other 
kind of killing. 
The focus on sanctioning speech is too broad because if there 
are indeed times when the government should muck around in the 
market for communities, then it seems just arbitrary that this partic-
ular technique - sanctioning inappropriate speech - should be 
picked out like this. Maybe some cases limiting censorship are 
quite easy. Punishing criticism of the government, for example, is 
an effective way to undermine the democratic processes, so a First 
Amendment that protected criticism makes a great deal of sense. 
But governmental secrecy is also a way to undermine the demo-
cratic process; yet there is no First Amendment bar to government 
secrets. Even more so with governmental lies.Go In any case, 
whatever push there is to ban censorship of governmental criticism, 
it's not at all clear why that same push carries over to censorship of, 
for example, pornography. Censorship of pornography might be 
stupid, or self-defeating; but considering it the same as censorship 
of antigovernmental speech is bizarre. 
If what gets the First Amendment talk going is this focus on 
neutrality - on this idea that the government somehow stands neu-
tral in this "market" where individuals are asked to join, or defect 
from, certain communities - then this debate makes sense only if 
you are the sort who is blind to the ways in which social sanctions 
are sanctions just as legal sanctions are, and blind to the ways in 
which the state, consistent with the narrow First Amendment, uses 
social sanctions all the time. If you believed that legal sanctions 
were fundamentally different, if you believed that the state only 
played a role through legal sanctions, if you believed that the effect 
of legal sanctions was equal regardless of viewpoint, then you might 
think that this anticensorship doctrine made sense. 
60. Lying, for example, is what the government did to justify its atomic bombing of Japan. 
See, e.g., GAR ALPEROVITZ, THE DECISION To USE TIIE ATOMIC BOMB AND THE ARCHITEC. 
TURE OF AN AMERICAN MYIH 421-668 (1995). Yet lying as a challenge to government 
speech is an underdeveloped constitutional domain. See MARK G. YuooF, WHEN GOVERN· 
MENT SPEAKS: Pouncs, LAW, AND GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN AMERICA 6-10, 51-66 
(1983); Richard Delgado, The Language of the Arms Race: Should the People Limit Govern-
ment Speech?, 64 B.U. L. REv. 961 (1984). 
May 1996] Post Constitutionalism 1455 
But Post can't believe this. Thus for him it should be a more 
difficult question, just why the First Amendment doctrine is as nar-
row as it is. Put another way, if domains were really distinct, and if 
governmental neutrality were really the objective, then it is not 
clear why protecting speech in each domain is the way to secure 
governmental neutrality. Maybe in the democracy domain, the gov-
ernment can't muck around with speech without undermining the 
very purpose of democracy. But it is not clear why neutrality would 
mean anticensorship in the community domain. As long as a right 
of exit - even just dialngic exit - exi~ts, nothing yet shows why 
communities can't censor. Censorship, within the community, is 
just shaming by other means. 
C. Civility and Change 
The government uses social meanings to advance its goals; it 
acts to construct social meanings to advance its goals. All of this is 
somehow off the First Amendment's screen. Though the focus of 
the First Amendment is said to be neutrality, the effects of these 
acts on free speech neutrality are ignored. This omission may be 
forgivable. No one yet has made sense of this generality of govern-
mental speech regulation.61 First Amendment focus has always 
been on the narrower question of censorship. Why change now? 
But even here there are questions to raise. We can see the point 
by considering the limitations on the state's ability to enforce what 
Post calls "civility rules." The common law, remember, had a rela-
tively elaborate structure for enforcing rules of civility in speech 
and !J.Ction; many of these rules have been eliminated by the First 
Amendment. The government, the argument goes, must remain 
neutral among perspectives; it remains neutral by denying to any 
particular perspective the power of the state to enforce its view of 
what is "civil." Instead, these are battles to be waged exclusively on 
the social field, through voluntary actions at least at the level of 
speech. 
The picture here is essentially volunteerist. Communities get 
built, this picture suggests, through the voluntary associations of in-
dividuals; individuals scan the field and enter the most attractive 
clubs; and against this background, all the Constitution must do is 
preserve a certain space for individuals to say their piece. Once 
they say their piece, the communities they would endorse can con-
struct themselves. But that they can say their piece, without fear of 
governmental sanction, is all the Constitution must require. 
61. The best accounts of the government speech question are: YuooF, supra note 60; 
Steven Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. REV. 565 (1980). 
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Speech has the most important place in this account. It's not 
that the individual must always be given a space to do whatever he 
wants; only say (p. 190). Even more limited than that, what's re-
quired is that she be given a space where the state will not use its 
power to punish her for saying whatever she wants to say, though of 
course, others in the community may punish her for what she says 
by disassociation, or scorn. All that the Constitution requires is 
that one single lifeline of free speech be preserved - the constant 
power to say, against the community, that a different way of living 
should be adopted. 
This lifeline translates into a space where the individual may be 
"uncivil" - where the individual may fl.out the norms of the com-
munity, as a way to get the community to rethink its norms. The 
picture here is of Robert Paul Cohen - a draft protester, stepping 
outside society's terms of decency, as a way to highlight the inde-
cency of that society.62 The idea is that by preserving this space for 
individual dissent, by constitutionally protecting the right of the un-
civil, we will protect this market in communities, always allowing a 
deviant way to bid for a new society. The right to be uncivil, then, 
is understood as a way to make society more transformative. 
But this is not a complete account; the right to be uncivil is not 
unambiguously a power to transform. The association is a mistake, 
though we should be careful in excavating just what the mistake is. 
Post's picture has two parts - one of the unencumbered indi-
vidual simply selecting which community to join; and the second the 
noble protester, protected by the First Amendment to stand outside 
civility the better to gain the attention of the community-selecting 
soul. We could question each, but I want to start with the second. 
It should be a question whether - not an assumption that - all, or 
most, or the most significant uncivil speech really functions like this. 
For against the picture of Cohen we can place the picture of the 
KKK - not the KKK marching in Skokie, but the KKK marching 
in Selma. What is uncivil speech of the KKK in Selma, say, in 1954, 
doing? 
To answer this we should return to the account of social mean-
ing sketched above. Recall that as well as solving collective action 
problems, social meanings are themselves collective goods. They 
require, to function, collective action, both in ascribing a certain 
meaning to a certain action, and in behaving "appropriately" in re-
sponse to that action. Enough must shun, or scorn, the person who 
lies, or litters, for lying and littering to be social meanings; but this 
act of shunning, or scorn, requires work. It takes the collective 
62. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
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work of many individuals. For a social meaning really to function 
as a social meaning, we all, or most of us, must do something. 
Put this way, we might begin to wonder, just how do these things 
work anyway? If it takes effort, why do we see it? Why, especially 
given that these goods, these social meanings, are themselves public 
goods: if they exist for any, they exist for all. So if public goods, 
why is it that people contribute to their supply? For we might imag-
ine the forgiving sort - the person who, when confronted with be- · 
havior that has a negative social meaning, forgives the person who 
has misbehaved.63 That person might reason like this: I agree that 
the social meanings of our society are good ones, that they ought to 
exist and ought to direct behavior; but they will exist whether or 
not I contribute to their supply. If they don't exist, then my contri-
bution won't make them exist; if they do exist, then my one noncon-
tribution won't take them away. I can simply free ride off of 
everyone else's contribution here. I can just forgive the person who 
misbehaves. 
Forgiveness might be its own virtue, and we might imagine cases 
where people ought to forgive each other.64 But it is clear that if 
everyone reasoned like our forgiving sort, pretty soon there 
wouldn't be many social meanings that had any negative bite. 
Something must induce the forgiving sort not always to forgive, but 
sometimes to condemn, just as something must induce the indiffer-
ent sort not always to ignore socially good behavior, but sometimes 
to praise. Something must induce them to contribute, that is, to the 
construction of this social meaning, or else this social meaning will 
no longer survive. 
What induces individuals to contribute to the supply of a social 
meaning is what we might think of as a second-level social meaning, 
a social meaning about whether one should contribute to the supply 
of a social meaning. For if there is a social meaning about improp-
erly forgiving, then there is a cost suffered by an individual when he 
or she improperly forgives. It is not just that individuals are to shun 
those who violate social rules, but they are also to shun those who 
fail to shun. Primary social meanings may direct how people ought 
to behave; but secondary social meanings direct how people ought 
to behave when others fail to behave. 
It is here then that we can see the ambiguous role that uncivil 
speech might play. Post's vision is that uncivil speech is a way to 
help break up an existing community, that it is a bid for a different 
63. This is not to say that forgiveness is improper. It is indeed sometimes proper; but the 
point is that it can be improper as well. See Martha C. Nussbaum, Equity and Mercy, 22 
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 83 (1993). 
64. Perhaps the clearest case is forgiveness against one's own interest. Here at least, the 
motives for forgiveness seem clearly to be something other than evading the social responsi-
bilities of a particular social norm. 
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community, and that this sort of bidding ought to be protected. But 
uncivil speech could as well be, not a bid for a different community, 
but a threat to help cement an existing community. If community is 
just that place where social meanings exist, and if social meanings 
exist only when supported by punishments, then what uncivil be-
havior might be is a way of punishing those who are beginning to 
defect from the proper social meanings. Then uncivil speech func-
tions to entrench, not disentrench, social meanings. 
Think again about the ambiguity of uncivil speech by the KKK. 
I describe for you the fact that the KKK has burned a cross on 
someone's land. What is that action doing? Well, we might imag-
ine two very different communities: one a community in the pre-
Civil Rights Movement South - say, 1961 Selma; the second, Sko-
kie. In the second community, I might - though with a big leap of 
faith, I will confess - agree with Post about what this burning does. 
It is a bid for a different community.65 A hateful, and thoroughly 
discredited community, but a bid for a community where non-
whites, or non-Christians, or gays and lesbians, have a different so-
cial status just because of that fact. To protect uncivil speech in 
Skokie might be a way to protect the right of some minority to say: 
"Hey, America, let's try it this way." It might be Cohen, though an 
extremely repulsive Cohen. 
But this is not the function of the cross-burning in 1961 Selma. 
Cross-burning in 1961 Selma is a way of reasserting a dominant so-
cial meaning of inequality. It is a way of reminding a swaying com-
munity of social meanings that already exist. It is a way of adding a 
coercive force to those existing social meanings, to support them 
when stigma is giving out. Here the function of the uncivil speech is 
to entrench, not transform, an existing society. It is a bid to en-
trench that society by adding a threat of force behind the already 
existing stigma associated with nonracist behavior. This threat 
might fail, and our confidence that it will fail may lead us to ignore 
it. But its function, and role, are different. 
What is left out of Post's account is precisely this difference. 
"Uncivil" speech has a role, but its role is not always to bid for a 
different community. And the same point can be made about his 
treatment of the meaning of state intervention to suppress uncivil 
speech. This too can be ambiguous, but Post treats it as unitary. 
Post's picture is again Cohen - the police arresting Cohen, or Bull 
Connor's dogs in Birmingham. Again, the state's intervention 
means the suppression of dissent, a way for the majority to achieve 
dominance over this dissent. 
65. See Steven H. Shiffrin, Racist Speech, Outsider Jurisprudence, and the Meaning of 
America, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 43, 87 (1994) (discussing whether racist speech makes a contri-
bution to public dialogue). 
May 1996] Post Constitutionalism 1459 
But what of Eisenhower's troops in Little Rock? Or the federal 
troops resisting George Wallace at the University of Alabama? 
Here the meaning of the state's intervention is quite different. The 
meaning is about the validation of one fundamental value - equal-
ity - rather than the suppression of another - free speech. It is 
not about supporting a dominant view; it's about protecting a mi-
nority's interest. 
These examples underline the differences in meaning that state 
action can have. Sometimes entrenching of the status quo; some-
times disentrenching. This difference Post doesn't account.66 But it 
might seem that this does not undermine Post's basic point - the 
claim that the government must remain neutral in this marketplace 
of community-building (p. 138). Even if it is true, that is, that some-
times uncivil speech is directed at preserving the status quo, and 
that sometimes uncivil speech is directed at transforming it, the 
state, in allowing all such uncivil speech, is remaining neutral be-
tween preserving and transforming social contexts (p. 10). 
There is this formal neutrality. But we should think a bit more 
before we conclude that in substance, the laissez-faire is also the 
neutral. For imagine a well-socialized community, where social 
norms are fully internalized by members of that community. Then 
think about the difference in the difficulty between making two 
kinds of changes to this community. One is the change of transfor-
mation when some individual or some group decides it wants to 
change some part of the social norms of that community. The other 
is the change of preservation when some individual or some group 
decides it. wants to preserve some social norms. Formally, of 
course, both groups face the same challenge. Both must convince a 
significant portion of the community to follow them if either is to 
prevail. But the difference between them is in background mecha-
nisms that support, or resist, the change in each. For what it means 
to say that a community is well-socialized is just that when individu-
als begin to defect from the dominant social norms, other social 
norms intervene to punish them. When an individual begins to act 
against the dominant norms of the community, other members of 
the community are to act against that defection, and if they don't 
act, then others are to act against them for failing to enforce social 
norms. The act of defecting is costly; and this is a cost built into the 
very idea of social norms. 
Thus when individuals, or groups, act against a prevailing social 
norm, all things being equal, they suffer a burden that is greater 
66. Post does distinguish the rule's being the expression of the general view from its being 
the expression of a view "hegemonically imposed by one dominant cultural group onto 
others," but he hasn't distinguished the role of a rule that expresses a general view or a 
hegemonic view from one expressing a just view rightfully imposed. P. 67. 
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than the burden of someone acting to sustain a social norm. For 
when someone acts to sustain a social norm, the norms of loyalty 
reward that person. But when someone act to change a social 
norm, the norms of loyalty punish him. The cost, therefore, of 
transformation, all things being equal, is greater than the cost of 
preservation. 
Allowing uncivil speech, then, is a way for the state to ratify this 
difference in the costs of transformation and preservation. Indeed, 
it might be worse than that. It might be that the benefit of uncivil 
speech is greater for the preservationists than the transformation-
ists, though of course this is an empirical question. Empirics 
notwithstanding, it is quite plausible - indeed, it is the history of 
our country - that the uncivil speech is more effective in frighten-
ing people into the status quo than it is in shocking them out of the 
status quo. The free speech dissident is a romantic figure in consti-
tutional lore, but his actions were probably not as effective as the 
threats of the norm-enforcers in the South. 
Thus there is this background against which this formal neutral-
ity that Post describes must be evaluated. While the state may be 
formally neutral when it refuses to punish uncivil speech that is 
transformative as well as uncivil speech that is preservative, the ef-
fect of this neutrality may be quite different between these two 
objectives. Uncivil speech is more likely the tool of choice for sta-
tus-quo-preserving social norms than it is for status-quo-transform-
ing social norms; and hence the effect of protecting uncivil speech is 
to further burden the efforts at transformation. Formal neutrality 
notwithstanding, the effect of this rule is further to preserve the sta-
tus quo. 
Now I am the last person who can complain that Post's account 
here is too simple, not sensitive enough to a difference in the kinds 
of uncivil speech that there are. Given my complaint above about 
borders, it is of course an unbelievably difficult task to distinguish 
the transformative from the entrenching. No dunderhead rule 
could describe it, and I am not convinced that in the abstract the 
difference should matter. Indeed, one need not be a pure Burkian 
to understand that there are lots of good reasons why the status quo 
should be difficult to change. Or at least we can identify aspects of 
the status quo that we would want to make difficult to change. We 
can neither criticize in the abstract the difficulty of changing the 
status quo, nor can we identify a clear rule that would help distin-
guish status-quo-preserving from status-quo-transforming speech. 
Nonetheless, there are two points that I think are important that 
might come from this point about the difference between trans-
forming and preserving speech. The first is about constitutional law 
generally. If the experience of post-Communist constitutionalism 
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has taught us anything, it has taught us that this difference is a 
source of an important gap in constitutional theory. For ordinarily 
we think of a constitution as an entrenching device. We think, that 
is, that what a constitution is to do is entrench a certain way of 
being. The image is of Ulysses and the mast: the idea is that we 
need a constitution to bind us to our most important values; we 
need a way to restrict ourselves from doing what in our more reflec-
tive mode we believe we shouldn't do. 
But this is not all that a constitution does. For sometimes a con-
stitution is designed not so much to preserve the status quo, as to 
change it. Sometimes it is designed not to entrench a certain way of 
being, but to dislodge it. This, for example, is what constitutional-
ism in post-Communist Europe is about. The constitutions in post-
Communist Europe are not designed to entrench a certain social 
order, or way of being; they are designed to change an order or way 
of being. Their aim is to remake a social order, to change patterns 
of thought constructed by fifty or seventy years of communism, and 
to change these habits of the heart into patterns that would support 
constitutionalism. How this is done is an extremely difficult ques-
tion, but from what I've said so far, it should be clear just what sort 
of question it is. For this effort at constitutionalism in post-commu-
nist Europe is an effort at transforming something about the social 
order in post-Communist Europe. It is an effort at changing the 
social meaning of various institutions in the post-Communist de-
mocracies, not an effort at entrenching certain institutions. 
What should be obvious is that the techniques of this transform-
ative constitutionalism are not necessarily the same techniques as 
the techniques of codifying constitutionalism. How a constitution 
codifies certain practices of social life may well be different from 
how it sets up the conditions for changing them. More importantly, 
techniques for codifying practices of social life may well make im-
possible techniques for changing them. 
Constitutionalism in general hasn't thought enough about the 
differences between these two kinds of constitutionalism, nor 
enough about how to integrate them. Post's approach here, like 
constitutionalism generally, is not sensitive to the differences that 
transformative constitutionalism might make.67 While this fault, if 
it is a fault, doesn't distinguish him relative to other constitutional-
ists, it does matter, I want to suggest, to his own account in one 
extremely significant way. 
67. This is not to say that Post doesn't see the difference at all. He is sensitive to the 
common law's objective as either to "shape and alter social norms" or to "maintain social 
norms," but he is quick to see the codifying as the "rationale" of the law, and leave aside the 
possibility of a transformative r~tionale. P. 65. 
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This is the second point that might follow about the difference 
between transformative and preserving speech, and it ties most di-
rectly to what is, in my view, the weakest chapter of the book - the 
last, the "reprise." Here Post addresses what is for us one of the 
most difficult First Amendment problems - hate speech. His ap-
proach is extremely careful, and sensitive, and conditional: he has 
no firm conclusion about whether hate speech should be regulated, 
because he fully well understands the strongest reason to regulate 
such speech. This is the concern that a history of racism has de-
stroyed the preconditions for responsive democracy (pp. 320-21). 
A significant segment of society, whether defined on racial or gen-
der lines, is alienated from the dominant discourse of American de-
mocracy. This alienation makes it impossible for these Americans 
to participate on equal terms within a responsive democracy.68 If 
that is so, then it might well be proper "to take steps to eliminate this 
alienation, even if these steps are inconsistent with the individualist 
principles of the American First Amendment tradition. 
Post has not written a brief, and that's the beauty of the book. 
One feels the struggle in his thought as he works through the prob-
lem. But something is missing from the account. As he fully well 
acknowledges that a compromise in these First Amendment princi-
ples might be necessary, he simultaneously speaks as if this compro-
mise would be a profound loss. If we narrowed the range of 
possible communities that the Constitution allows us to select 
among, this would be a loss of great constitutional moment. The 
writing makes one feel as if integrity is on the line; that we will 
forever be marked as compromised, or fallen, if we take steps to 
close off certain communities from the possible communities that 
American democracy might select among. 
But when one asks just what we would lose, this pathos begins 
to fade. I understand what it means to say we would lose something 
if communitarians weren't free to try to sell the life of community, 
or if Republicans weren't free to try to sell the life of the Contract, 
or if Baptists weren't free to try to sell the life of Christianity. I 
understand that loss, even though I could never imagine myself a 
communitarian, or Republican, or Baptist. When I think of these 
groups, of the world they want to construct, I am angry, or frus-
trated, or antagonistic; but I understand the importance of keeping 
space open for these visions, and this passion. 
But when I think of the community the KKK wants me to imag-
ine, none of that tolerant fuzziness remains. I confess, I really don't 
see what we lose by giving up the option of the political community 
68. See p. 119 ("[P]ublic deliberation cannot achieve its purposes if it is 'considered or 
experienced as coercive, or invasive, or otherwise a violation of one's identity or freedom.' ") 
(quoting Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1527 (1988)). 
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that the KKK wants us to embrace. I don't see what we lose, be-
cause I think we've seen enough in this debate. 
A comparative might make the point more strongly. Germany 
is a mature constitutional democracy; indeed, I would suggest, more 
mature in some ways than our own. They have a free speech princi-
ple that has functioned effectively to limit the government's ability 
to regulate speech. But it is a principle that has an important ex-
ception: Germany thinks of itself as a "militant democracy," which 
means it believes it must not only assure democracy, but assure the 
conditions of democracy.69 It rejects the idea that a "spontaneous 
ordering" (p. 194) will assure that the conditions for democratic 
thought will exist, or survive, on its own. It doesn't believe in the 
invisible hand when applied to the conditions of democracy. In-
stead, the German constitution is explicitly directed against certain 
views of the community that are inconsistent with principles Ger-
many declares that it holds fundamental. Those views of the com-
munity have been taken off the table in· Germany. Nazism in 
particular is not a permissible form of life in Germany; it is not an 
option under the German constitution. That is not to say that Ger-
many will never embrace fascism again; it is just to say that if it 
does, it will not be under the existing constitutional regime. 
One might look at this narrowing of the political options under 
the German regime and regret it. One might think, that is, that 
some principle of democracy has been lost by this limitation. That 
the "logic" of democracy, or free speech, has been violated. But 
again, I can't muster that thought. It seems to me perfectly just, 
and eminently rational, for Germany to say to itself, and commit to 
itself, that it rejects this form of community. It seems to me per-
fectly just, not because in general I think putting a form of commu-
nity off the table makes sense, but because I know something -
maybe not much, but something - about recent German history. 
Against this background, it seems to me perfectly just for Germany 
to promise itself, and the world, that that nation it will never again 
be. 
That promise is a form of transformative constitutionalism.70 It 
is a technique for identifying a pathology in the existing social struc-
tures of a constitutional democracy, and for taking steps to elimi-
nate those structures. It is a kind of therapy, which works to 
undermine the pathology identified. It is about making the nation 
something other than it was. 
69. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 
213-27 (1994) {describing the principle of "militant democracy"). 
70. The approach is explored in Run G. TEITEL, TRANsmoNAL JusncE {forthcoming 
1997). 
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This goal of Germany, to eliminate the fascist in its soul, is a 
good one. The only question one might have is whether the means 
chosen to that end are effective. The end justifies the means (what 
else would justify the means?), and the end of becoming a Kantian 
nation seems to me, for Germany, perfectly just. 
Germany is more than an example. One might think that we 
too have had a transformative moment in our own constitutional 
history. That was the Fourteenth Amendment. One might, that is, 
understand the Fourteenth Amendment to be a similar self-ac-
knowledgment of a pathology in the American soul.71 One might 
then understand it as an effort in transformative constitutionalism. 
To the extent that it identifies a particular kind of transformation 
that we as a nation have committed ourselves to, it represents as 
well a reason to think differently about constitutional principle as it 
relates to this chosen therapy. It gives us a reason, that is, to under-
stand the regulation of hate speech not as we understand the regu-
lation of speech about communism, or anarchism, or 
republicanism,72 but rather to understand the question of hate 
speech the way Germany understands the question of fascism.73 
I understa~d that this is inconsistent with some high principle of 
liberalism. I suspect that the ACLU would not be proud of this 
weakness of will in a card-carrying member of that organization. 
But I understand the ACLU's disappointment to be because the 
ACLU's conception of the First Amendmertt is just the conception 
that Post is attacking. Its conception is that the principles it identi-
fies must be carried everywhere in just the same way, or else some-
thing has been compromised. Its conception is that there is one 
free speech principle, and its crusade is to extend it to as many 
places as possible. 
That isn't Post's view, and it is not mine either. The First 
Amendment should extend in ways consistent with just social un-
derstandings of widely different domains. It should extend so as to 
give individual and democratic space. It should extend to construct 
a certain life. But I no more understand why it must extend to all 
sorts of hate than I understand why it must extend to the Presi-
dent's press secretary's right to disagree with the President. I don't 
understand, that is, why, as a matter of principle, we could not self-
71. This is the argument of Kenneth Karst, pointed to by Post. See p. 305; Kenneth L. 
Karst, Citizenship, Race, and Marginality, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (1988). 
72. These three domains of speech have, of course, all been historically regulated. See, 
e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (communism); Gitlow v. New York, 268 
U.S. 652 (1925) (anarchism); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273-76 (1964) 
(discussing Sedition Act of 1798). 
73. Cf. Akhil Reed Amar, The Case of the Missing Amendments: R.A.V. v. City of St. 
Paul, 106 HARv. L. REv. 124 (1992). 
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consciously decide that the principle must be limited, if the social 
meaning of equality is to be achieved. 
We might, of course, not have so decided. We might not have 
decided collectively, in a proper way, that equality norms should 
inform, or alter, speech norms. Or it might just be that limiting 
speech is a stupid way to bring about this equality.74 We have 
learned a lot recently about that question. I never would have 
thought, for example, that someone would say that in America in 
1995, the harm of being discriminated against because one is a 
white male is the same as that of being discriminated against be-
cause one is black. Nonetheless, people say this, and many believe 
it, and it might just be the deep pathology of American racism that 
this kind of belief cannot be ignored. That all might be. But that it 
seems to me is an empirical question, not a matter of first (amend-
ment) principle. Which means that we should be thinking about 
how we integrate this transformative ideal into our constitutional 
regime, not how we ignore it. 
That we ignore it should be plain. The Fourteenth Amendment, 
rather than stap.ding for this principle of transformation, is slowly 
becoming the charter of the status quo;75 rather than especially em-
powering Congress to act to transform the status quo, to remake 
the society and social meanings that one might think pathological, it 
is quickly becoming the· principle that says that any effort at remak-
ing the status quo is unconstitutional. Rather than the Fourteenth 
Amendment modifying the First, the First has modified the 
Fourteenth. 
Unitary constitutionalism will not see these points differently. 
Unitary constitutionalism will understand all effort to regulate 
speech the same way. What is surprising about Post here is that 
while he is not unitarian about domains, he is a unitarian about 
purpose. There is a principle to keep as much on the table as possi-
ble; this, he suggests, is the principle of democracy. One hundred 
and thirty years after the Civil War, one wants to know just why. 
D. Federalism and Community 
There's a picture of America at the founding, somewhat naive, 
fundamentally crude, but useful nonetheless. The picture is some-
thing like this: America at the Founding was composed of small 
towns, villages really, that peppered a vast expanse of territory. 
The largest city at the Founding was New York. Its population was 
74. See Shiffrin, supra note 65, at 102-03. 
75. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. a. 2097 (1995); R.A.V. v. City of 
St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
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50,000.76 The distance between the nation's two largest cities, New 
York and Philadelphia, was ninety miles. That took several days to 
travel. America at the founding was like imagining a nation today 
composed of the nations of Switzerland, Georgia, Russia, and 
Japan. 
This fact of relative isolation mattered. It mattered because it 
aligned "what was possible" with "what was desirable." We think 
of the Framers as having chosen a relatively decentralized federalist 
structure; but it is not clear just what more they could have done. 
In a world as decentralized as the framing world was, it was not just 
undesirable to centralize authority in the federal government; more 
importantly, it was just unfeasible. 
A similar coincidence - of the feasible and with the desirable 
- touches this issue of community. In the sense that Post means 
community, community at the founding was local, and geographi-
cal. "Connectedness" was local - one knew, and worked, and so-
cialized, and struggled with people nearby, because anything else 
was impossible. There were dimensions along which people were 
within the "national" community, but not many. 
This fact fits with, and makes sense of, the original division of 
legislative jurisdiction, and constitutional right. For again, at the 
local level, communities had the power to regulate broadly, in ways 
that would be constitutive of a certain kind of community, while at 
the national level not. At the national level the Constitution lim-
ited the feqeral government in ways it did not at the local level. 
The First Amendment, in particular, limited the federal govern-
ment, and not the states. 
The difficulty for American constitutionalism, then, is that this 
fundamental fact of the framing context - this relative isolation -
has changed, and it is the fundamental challenge of American con-
stitutional interpretation to accommodate this change. Whether de-
sirable or not, it is now feasible to regulate most everything at the 
national level; whether desirable or not, it is less feasible to consti-
tute communities by regulating at the local level. The challenge for 
constitutionalism is how to account for this change, while preserv-
ing something of the framing balance. 
The change is fundamental for the concerns that Post raises. For 
if "community," in the sense that Post means, fit the reality of a 
local political community - when, in other words, connectedness 
was local, and hence community was geography - then it made 
sense to grant the local political community special status in its 
power to regulate individuals within its jurisdiction. But to the ex-
tent that local political communities have no real connection with 
76. See DONAlD B. DODD, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE STATES OF TIIE UNITED 
STATES 454 (1993). 
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"community" - to the extent that connectedness is no longer geo-
graphic - it makes less and less sense to grant the local political 
community special status in its power to regulate individuals within 
its jurisdiction. Lincoln may have been from Illinois, but Illinois is 
just where I live. 
The history of American constitutionalism is in part the history 
of this accommodation - the accommodation to this changing 
predicate of isolation. In the powers context, the change has ex-
tended federal power broadly, with limited efforts to rein it back 
in.77 In the First Amendment context, the response has been to 
treat all governments like the federal government. Even if the 
framing understanding allowed a wider range of democratic control 
at the local level over the nature and construction of community~ 
what incorporation has come to mean is that government at the lo-
cal level is no different from government at the national level. 
There is one First Amendment, and it applies without distinction 
from the highest to localist levels of government. 
This has meant a certain confusion. For it is not as if this one 
First Amendment applies so as to force the government to be neu-
tral - in the sense of not affecting which outcome, or which com-
munity, prevails - at either the national or local level. As I said 
above, the government is limited in its power to censor, but one can 
muck around with a speech or a community market in more ways 
than censorship. Nor is it as if this one First Amendment success-
fully channeled traditionally local speech regulation to the local 
level, and national speech regulation to the national level. This is 
an era when those most forcefully pressing "states' rights" are also 
those most eager that the national government promote "family 
values. "78 
The real change in the constitutional landscape brought about 
by these shifts is the shift between public and private regulation of 
speech. Of course no strong limitation on the power of localities to 
regulate speech existed at the Founding; local democracies could 
then constitute communities as they saw fit. While the First 
Amendment now would reach these goveriunental efforts at the 
construction of community, most such construction is now private, 
and hence without the reach of the First Amendment. Hence, from 
one perspective, one might believe that the existing constitutional 
regime is in effect equivalent to the original, since, as with the origi-
nal, the locus of community-building is outside the scope of the 
First Amendment. 
77. I develop this idea in the context of federalism in Translating Federalism: United 
States v. Lopez, 1995 SuP. Cr. REv. 125. 
78. See, e.g., CoNTRAcr WITH AMERICA (Ed Gillespie & Bob Schellhas eds., 1994). 
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The difference, of course, is that this new locus of community-
building is also outside the scope of democratic control. It is pri-
vate, not public, and hence free from both constitutional constraint 
and democratic constraint. Not that the original regime could be 
thought fundamentally democratic; its democracy was of course 
quite flawed. But clearly the new regime disables democratic ef-
forts in reconstructing community, at least so far as they employ 
certain proscribed First Amendment means. 
One might have thought this result inevitable; that there would 
be no way for incorporation to extend the limits of the First 
Amendment outside the reach of government, and hence the conse-
quence that most regulation of speech is private and outside the 
~cope of the First Amendment was, in some important sense, una-
voidable. But as Richard Ford has well argued, as a historical mat-
ter, this was in no sense obvious, or compelled.79 For originally, 
"corporations," whether commercial or municipal, were the same 
sort of creature; both equally the construction of government; both 
equally subject to whatever limitations extended to government. 
Given this common origin, what begs explanation is just why one of 
these original "corporations" is considered a state actor, and the 
other not. 
This is not the place to resolve these oddities. But what they, 
and the federalist structure they result from, suggest, along with the 
account that Post offers, are a few uncomfortable thoughts that will 
not resolve themselves easily within this constitutional regime. The 
first thought is that speech regulation, or as I would call it, social-
meaning regulation, has been a permanent feature of social and 
political life; all that has changed is the locus of that regulation. To 
the extent that the framing regime endorsed a decentralized and 
local form of social-meaning regulation, that value of federalism 
might be one that continues to inform the decision about who 
should have this power of regulation. But the uncomfortable fact is 
that it is a decision, not compelled by the original structure, and not 
well-executed in the existing regime. From a federalist perspective, 
one may well believe that too much of this social-meaning regula-
tion goes on at the federal level, and that too little goes on at a level 
corresponding to the connectedness of the community. Likewise, 
to the extent that there is regulation at the level of the community, 
one might well question the extent to which this is regulation 
outside democratic control. 
The difficult question for the present constitutional regime is 
just why self-conscious efforts by democratically responsible agents 
to redefine social meaning are constitutionally problematic, while 
79. See Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal 
Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1843, 1879-80 (1994). 
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self-conscious efforts by agents democratically irresponsible to 
redefine social meaning are not. Why is it that when you add de-
mocracy into the bargain the mix turns sour, but when the market is 
the bargain, the mix is perfectly sweet? 
CONCLUSION 
There's no single principle of free speech; there are a collection 
of understandings. This collection is not expressible in any single 
phrase; it is instead like a code, applying differently in separate 
spheres of social life. This collection of principles is who we are -
they are for the most part invisible; they for the most part function 
invisibly; and they for the most part limit governmental action in 
ways plainly understood. Yet despite this collection of understand-
ings, despite this multiplicity, despite this invisibility, constitutional 
law insists on a single vision. It insists on a single principle that 
might make this social understanding appear like law, on a principle 
that might make it function like law - like a simple constitutional 
text, with determined directness. It is understandable why constitu-
tional law so seeks. For if it is to function to constrain, if it is to 
have the capacity to impose on others, if it is to impose this princi-
ple through the tools of courts, then this simplicity, this directness, 
is just what constitutional law needs. It needs, that is, a way to deny 
the complexity that it also is. 
The power of Post's book is that it compels us to see the com-
plexities of First Amendment life - it compels us to see, that is, the 
divergent modalities of free speech regulation. The free speech 
principle that makes most sense of who we are is one that applies 
differently in these different domains; it is one that can limit itself 
according to these different domains. What we need then is some 
tool for tracking these domains, and selecting a body of principles 
based on these domains. Interestingly, perhaps accidentally, the 
framing structure gave us something of this. It left the places of 
community free to regulate, while limiting governmental power in 
the places that were not community. But that structure rested, we 
might say, upon a fact of isolation; and as that fact of isolation has 
disappeared, this structure could no longer be sustained. The fric-
tions of social life before kept separate these different domains of 
regulation, and as these frictions have disappeared, this separation 
has disappeared as well. 
What is needed, then, is a new tool for keeping separate the 
regulation of these different domains. As Meir Dan-Cohen might 
say, what is needed is a device for keeping acoustically separate the 
regulation of these different domains, so that the rules of one need 
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not necessarily be relied upon in the other, so that the optimal mix 
of rules for both might be obtained.so 
It might be that the clumsiness, or crudeness, of current First 
Amendment doctrine is just such a device.81 But to know that 
would require much more analysis. What we can say is that it is not 
obvious that the solution to the current clumsiness is simply to be 
more open about the conflict of values that these separate domains 
might entail. Transparency is a solution only if the transparent in-
stitution can deal openly and effectively with the conflict that trans-
parency reveals. But this is not what this Court, or this judiciary, 
can do. We have been shown that the problem is more complex 
than the doctrine pretends; we have not been shown that it is not 
too complex for this legal culture to handle. 
80. See Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in 
Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984). 
81. This may be the best implication to be drawn from Elena Kagan's account of the 
motivating purpose behind First Amendment policy generally. Her argument is that an effort 
to screen improper governmental intent is behind much of First Amendment doctrine, even 
though none of the First Amendment doctrines directly pursue this end. The doctrines then 
may be the necessarily indirect devices for pursuing this end that could not be pursued di-
rectly. See Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive 
in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 413 (1996). 
